Absolute Audit Agent Skill

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Absolute Audit

Find and triage security problems across the repo — vulnerable dependencies (CVEs) and

risky code patterns — then fix the ones worth fixing, safely. Output is a severity-ranked

findings table with a remediation per item, not a raw scanner dump.

Runs the shared engine in references/health-engine.md — read it for the

DETECT → SCAN → TRIAGE → FIX → VERIFY → REPORT loop and the safety contract. This file

covers only what's specific to security auditing.

> Authorized defensive use. This command audits the user's *own* repository to find

> and fix weaknesses. It is for hardening, not for attacking systems or evading detection.

When to use

• "Run a security audit", "are we vulnerable?", "check our deps for CVEs".
• After a CVE disclosure affecting something you use.
• Periodic hygiene on main.

Distinct from the built-in /security-review (reviews the *pending diff* on your

branch) — audit scans the whole committed repo, deps included. They complement.

What it scans

1. Dependency vulnerabilities (CVEs) — primary:

| Ecosystem | Scanner |

|---|---|

| npm / pnpm / yarn | npm audit --json / pnpm audit --json / yarn npm audit --json |

| Python | pip-audit (preferred) or safety check |

| Go | govulncheck ./... |

| Cross-language | osv-scanner against the lockfile if available |

2. Code-level patterns — read-only grep/static pass for high-signal issues only:

hardcoded secrets/keys/tokens, eval/dynamic exec on input, SQL built by string

concatenation, missing authz checks on sensitive routes, disabled TLS verification, unsafe

deserialization, overly-broad CORS. Prefer the project's existing SAST/linter security

rules (eslint-plugin-security, bandit, gosec) if configured.

Report suspected leaked secrets but never print the secret value — reference

path:line and the kind.

Risk ranking (TRIAGE)

Rank by severity × exploitability × reachability, not raw CVSS:

| Severity | Default |

|---|---|

| Critical / High, reachable, fix available | fix now (wave 1) |

| Moderate, reachable | fix this pass |

| Low / not reachable from app code | report, usually defer |

| Transitive-only, no direct upgrade path | flag, note the blocking parent |

Mark each: is it reachable from the app's actual code paths? A CVE in an unused transitive

branch is lower priority than a Moderate one on a hot path. State the fixed version or the

mitigation for each.

Fix & verify

• Dep CVEs → resolve via the smallest version move that clears it (delegate the actual

bump mechanics to the upgrade flow's per-ecosystem steps). Prefer patched minors;

escalate to a major only when that's the only fix, and gate it.

• Code issues → apply the concrete fix (parameterize the query, move the secret to env

+ flag the leaked one for rotation, add the authz check). Each fix is its own small wave.

• After each wave, re-run the scanner: the finding must actually disappear, and tests/build

stay green. Never resolve by suppressing/allowlisting the alert.

• Leaked live secrets: flag for rotation — removing from code doesn't undo exposure.

Gotchas

• Audit fatigue → blanket ignore. Triage by reachability instead of muting the scanner.
• Fixing a CVE by suppressing it. An allowlisted advisory is still a vulnerability.
• Printing the secret. Reference location + type only; never echo the value.
• Deleting a secret from code ≠ safe. It's in git history and was exposed — rotate it.
• Stopping at deps. Many real issues are in code, not the dependency tree — run both passes.

Companion commands

• /absolute upgrade — does the actual version moves for vulnerable deps.
• /security-review (built-in) — pair with this to also cover your pending diff.
• /absolute work — if remediation is a real refactor (e.g. replacing an auth flow), hand off.