Cloud Security Skill for Claude

Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse

26k tokens

context cost

the whole folder, loaded on every use

files

ships runnable scripts

copies elsewhere

how many repositories repackaged it

334

stars on the repo

on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository

npx skills add https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill cloud-security

What comes with it

95 601 bytes besides the instruction

references/aws-iam-privesc.md

references/azure-entra-attacks.md

references/gcp-attacks.md

references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md

references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md

references/kubernetes-container-escape.md

scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py

scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py

scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py

scripts/imds_harvester.py

scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py

scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py

The instruction itself

6 sections, as written by the author

Cloud Security & Attack

When to Activate

Cloud penetration test / red team against AWS, Azure (Entra ID), or GCP
IAM / identity privilege escalation and cross-account or cross-tenant pivoting
Compromised web app or SSRF reachable from cloud compute — harvest metadata credentials
Kubernetes / container assessment, node breakout, cluster takeover
CI/CD and IaC review: Terraform state, OIDC federation trust policies, pipeline secrets
Post-exploitation: secret extraction, lateral movement, persistence in cloud control plane

Technique Map

|-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------|

| Container escape (runc Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626) | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | - |

Quick Start

# --- 0. Identify where you are ---
aws sts get-caller-identity                       # AWS
az account show && az ad signed-in-user show      # Azure
gcloud auth list && gcloud config get-value project  # GCP

# --- 1. AWS: enumerate then map privesc paths ---
python3 scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py --profile compromised --json paths.json
cloudfox aws --profile compromised all-checks      # alt: broad inventory
pacu  # > run iam__enum_permissions ; run iam__privesc_scan

# --- 2. SSRF / metadata: harvest creds from a reachable compute target ---
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --ssrf "https://app/fetch?url=" --provider aws
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --local --provider azure --resource https://vault.azure.net/

# --- 3. Azure Entra: device-code phish for tokens (authorized phishing only) ---
python3 scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py --resource https://graph.microsoft.com \
    --client-id 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e   # Auth Broker -> PRT path

# --- 4. GCP: build the service-account impersonation graph ---
python3 scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py --project TARGET --out gcp_graph.json

# --- 5. Kubernetes: what can this token do, and can we break out? ---
python3 scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py --kubeconfig ./kubeconfig
kubectl auth can-i --list ; peirates

# --- 6. CI/CD + IaC: audit federation trust + dump state secrets ---
python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --profile compromised
aws s3 cp s3://tf-state/prod/terraform.tfstate - | jq '.. | .password? // empty'

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

|-----------|-----------------|---------------------------------|------------|

| IAM privesc API calls | CloudTrail CreatePolicyVersion, AttachUserPolicy, CreateLoginProfile | Alert on IAM write by non-IAM-admin principal; GuardDuty PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/* | Use existing admin sessions; avoid bulk enum that trips anomaly detection |

| sts:AssumeRoot | CloudTrail AssumeRoot (regional only) | Elastic "AssumeRoot by Rare User and Member Account" (new-terms rule) | Rare-event detection fires on first use per (principal, member account) |

| IMDS SSRF | VPC flow to 169.254.169.254 from web tier; STS use from new ASN | GuardDuty UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration* (creds used off-instance) | Use creds from same egress IP where possible; creds expire — refresh fast |

| Entra device-code phish | Sign-in logs authenticationProtocol=deviceCode; Auth Broker client 29d9ed98-...; new device registration | Sentinel device-code anomaly; CA "block device code flow" | Tokens valid even after password reset; device-join = MFA-resistant persistence |

| GCP impersonation | GenerateAccessToken / generateAccessToken in Admin Activity + Data Access logs | Alert on impersonation by principal lacking a documented chain | Requires Data Access (DATA_READ) audit logs enabled to see token minting |

| Container escape (runc) | New process from /proc/self/fd/* cwd; host binary writes; nsenter in container | Falco Container escape/Drop and execute new binary; runc ≤1.1.11 inventory | Overwrites host runc → noisy; prefer read-only host FS read for stealth |

| IngressNightmare | NGINX ingress pod loads .so from /proc; outbound from controller | Falco/Sysdig "IngressNightmare" shared-lib load; ingress-nginx < 1.11.5/1.12.1 | Exploit hits admission webhook (often internal-only) — low external noise |

| OIDC trust abuse | CloudTrail AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from unexpected sub/repo | Alert on web-identity assume with mismatched aud/sub; RCP block | Wildcard sub (org:foo*) still exploitable; no creds needed |

Deep Dives

references/aws-iam-privesc.md — Classic + 2024 IAM escalation chains, sts:AssumeRoot, cross-account confused deputy / ExternalId, Cognito, secrets harvesting; detection per API.
references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md — IMDSv1/v2 mechanics, SSRF bypasses, Azure & GCP metadata token theft, EKS node-cred → IRSA/Pod Identity lateral movement.
references/azure-entra-attacks.md — Storm-2372 device-code → PRT → device-join chain, FOCI token families, Managed Identity abuse, Application Administrator → service principal → Global Admin.
references/gcp-attacks.md — actAs + resource-create impersonation, serviceAccountTokenCreator chains, Cloud Functions takeover, Vertex AI ModeLeak/P4SA/Ray escalation.
references/kubernetes-container-escape.md — runc Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626), privileged/hostPID/Docker-socket escapes, IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974), RBAC primitives, kubelet/etcd.
references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md — Terraform state secret extraction, OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub Actions / Terraform Cloud), pipeline secret theft, RCP/SCP defenses.

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17k tokens

How to use it

Copy the folder

Take hypnguyen1209/cloud-security from the repository into ~/.claude/skills for personal use, or into .claude/skills inside a project.

Check the name does not clash

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