AWS Iam Agent Skill

Manage IAM users, roles, and policies. Implement least-privilege access and security best practices. Use when configuring AWS identity and access management.

3k tokens

context cost

the whole folder, loaded on every use

files

instructions only

copies elsewhere

how many repositories repackaged it

511

stars on the repo

on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository

npx skills add https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill aws-iam

The instruction itself

13 sections, as written by the author

AWS IAM

Manage identity and access in AWS with least-privilege policies, roles, federation, and permission boundaries.

When to Use This Skill

Creating roles for EC2 instances, Lambda functions, or ECS tasks
Writing custom IAM policies with least-privilege access
Setting up OIDC federation for GitHub Actions or other CI/CD systems
Implementing permission boundaries for delegated administration
Auditing access with IAM Access Analyzer and credential reports
Configuring cross-account access with assume-role patterns
Enforcing MFA and session policies

Prerequisites

AWS CLI v2 installed and configured
IAM permissions: iam:* (or scoped to specific actions for least privilege)
For OIDC: ability to create identity providers (iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider)
AWS Organizations access for Service Control Policies (SCPs)

IAM Policy Structure

Every IAM policy follows the same JSON structure. Always specify the minimum actions and resources required.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "AllowS3ReadWrite",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "s3:GetObject",
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:ListBucket"
      ],
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket",
        "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/*"
      ],
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption": "aws:kms"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyUnencryptedUploads",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "s3:PutObject",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringNotEquals": {
          "s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption": "aws:kms"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Create and Manage Roles

# Create an EC2 instance role with trust policy
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name EC2AppRole \
  --assume-role-policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "ec2.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }]
  }' \
  --tags '[{"Key":"Team","Value":"platform"},{"Key":"Environment","Value":"production"}]'

# Create and attach an inline policy
aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name EC2AppRole \
  --policy-name s3-access \
  --policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/*"
    }]
  }'

# Attach a managed policy
aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name EC2AppRole \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy

# Create instance profile and associate the role
aws iam create-instance-profile --instance-profile-name EC2AppProfile
aws iam add-role-to-instance-profile \
  --instance-profile-name EC2AppProfile \
  --role-name EC2AppRole

# Create a Lambda execution role
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name LambdaExecRole \
  --assume-role-policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }]
  }'

aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name LambdaExecRole \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole

Cross-Account Access

# In Account B: create role that Account A can assume
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name CrossAccountReadRole \
  --assume-role-policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::111111111111:root"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {"sts:ExternalId": "unique-external-id-12345"}
      }
    }]
  }'

# In Account A: assume the role
aws sts assume-role \
  --role-arn arn:aws:iam::222222222222:role/CrossAccountReadRole \
  --role-session-name cross-account-session \
  --external-id unique-external-id-12345

# Use the temporary credentials
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="ASIAXXX"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="xxx"
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="xxx"

OIDC Federation for GitHub Actions

# Create the GitHub OIDC identity provider
aws iam create-open-id-connect-provider \
  --url https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  --client-id-list sts.amazonaws.com \
  --thumbprint-list "6938fd4d98bab03faadb97b34396831e3780aea1"

# Create a role for GitHub Actions with repo-scoped trust
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name GitHubActionsDeployRole \
  --assume-role-policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "Federated": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
      },
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com"
        },
        "StringLike": {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:my-org/my-repo:ref:refs/heads/main"
        }
      }
    }]
  }'

# Attach deployment permissions to the role
aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name GitHubActionsDeployRole \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/DeploymentPolicy

GitHub Actions workflow usage:

# .github/workflows/deploy.yml
permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read

jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActionsDeployRole
          aws-region: us-east-1
      - run: aws sts get-caller-identity

Permission Boundaries

# Create a permission boundary policy
aws iam create-policy \
  --policy-name DeveloperBoundary \
  --policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
      {
        "Sid": "AllowedServices",
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Action": [
          "s3:*",
          "lambda:*",
          "dynamodb:*",
          "sqs:*",
          "sns:*",
          "logs:*",
          "cloudwatch:*",
          "ecr:*",
          "ecs:*"
        ],
        "Resource": "*"
      },
      {
        "Sid": "DenyIAMChanges",
        "Effect": "Deny",
        "Action": [
          "iam:CreateUser",
          "iam:DeleteUser",
          "iam:CreateRole",
          "iam:DeleteRole",
          "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
          "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary",
          "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary"
        ],
        "Resource": "*"
      },
      {
        "Sid": "DenyOutsideRegion",
        "Effect": "Deny",
        "Action": "*",
        "Resource": "*",
        "Condition": {
          "StringNotEquals": {
            "aws:RequestedRegion": ["us-east-1", "us-west-2"]
          },
          "ForAnyValue:StringNotLike": {
            "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/admin-*"
          }
        }
      }
    ]
  }'

# Create a role with the permission boundary
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name DeveloperRole \
  --assume-role-policy-document file://trust-policy.json \
  --permissions-boundary "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/DeveloperBoundary"

IAM Access Analyzer and Auditing

# Create an IAM Access Analyzer
aws accessanalyzer create-analyzer \
  --analyzer-name account-analyzer \
  --type ACCOUNT

# List findings (externally accessible resources)
aws accessanalyzer list-findings \
  --analyzer-arn arn:aws:access-analyzer:us-east-1:123456789012:analyzer/account-analyzer

# Generate credential report
aws iam generate-credential-report
aws iam get-credential-report --output text --query Content | base64 -d > credential-report.csv

# Find users with console access but no MFA
aws iam list-users --query "Users[].UserName" --output text | while read user; do
  mfa=$(aws iam list-mfa-devices --user-name "$user" --query "MFADevices" --output text)
  if [ -z "$mfa" ]; then
    echo "NO MFA: $user"
  fi
done

# List all policies attached to a role
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name EC2AppRole
aws iam list-role-policies --role-name EC2AppRole

# Get the last-accessed services for a role
aws iam generate-service-last-accessed-details --arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EC2AppRole
# Then retrieve results with the returned JobId
aws iam get-service-last-accessed-details --job-id "job-id-from-above"

# Simulate a policy to test access
aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
  --policy-source-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EC2AppRole \
  --action-names s3:GetObject s3:PutObject \
  --resource-arns arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/data.json

Terraform IAM Role with OIDC

# OIDC provider for GitHub Actions
resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github" {
  url             = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
  client_id_list  = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
  thumbprint_list = ["6938fd4d98bab03faadb97b34396831e3780aea1"]
}

# Role for GitHub Actions
resource "aws_iam_role" "github_actions" {
  name = "GitHubActionsDeployRole"

  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
    Version = "2012-10-17"
    Statement = [{
      Effect = "Allow"
      Principal = {
        Federated = aws_iam_openid_connect_provider.github.arn
      }
      Action = "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
      Condition = {
        StringEquals = {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud" = "sts.amazonaws.com"
        }
        StringLike = {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub" = "repo:my-org/my-repo:*"
        }
      }
    }]
  })

  permissions_boundary = aws_iam_policy.boundary.arn
}

resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "deploy" {
  role       = aws_iam_role.github_actions.name
  policy_arn = aws_iam_policy.deployment.arn
}

# Permission boundary
resource "aws_iam_policy" "boundary" {
  name = "DeveloperBoundary"
  policy = jsonencode({
    Version = "2012-10-17"
    Statement = [
      {
        Sid      = "AllowedServices"
        Effect   = "Allow"
        Action   = ["s3:*", "lambda:*", "dynamodb:*", "ecs:*", "logs:*"]
        Resource = "*"
      },
      {
        Sid      = "DenyIAMEscalation"
        Effect   = "Deny"
        Action   = ["iam:CreateUser", "iam:CreateRole", "iam:AttachRolePolicy"]
        Resource = "*"
      }
    ]
  })
}

Service Control Policies (Organizations)

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "DenyRootAccount",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "*",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringLike": {
          "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:root"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "RequireIMDSv2",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringNotEquals": {
          "ec2:MetadataHttpTokens": "required"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DenyRegionsOutsideUS",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "*",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringNotEquals": {
          "aws:RequestedRegion": ["us-east-1", "us-west-2"]
        },
        "ForAnyValue:StringNotLike": {
          "aws:PrincipalArn": ["arn:aws:iam::*:role/OrganizationAdmin"]
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Troubleshooting

| Problem | Cause | Fix |

|---|---|---|

| Access Denied on API call | Missing or incorrect policy | Use simulate-principal-policy to test; check resource ARN format |

| Role cannot be assumed | Trust policy does not include the caller | Verify Principal in trust policy matches caller ARN |

| OIDC federation fails | Thumbprint or audience mismatch | Verify OIDC provider URL, client ID list, and condition keys |

| Permission boundary blocks action | Boundary does not include the action | Add the action to the boundary; effective = identity AND boundary |

| Credential report shows stale keys | Keys not rotated in 90+ days | Rotate keys; disable unused access keys |

| Service-linked role creation fails | Organization SCP blocks iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole | Add exception in SCP for the specific service |

| Cross-account assume role fails | Missing ExternalId or wrong account | Verify ExternalId matches; check account number in Principal |

| MFA condition not enforced | Condition key not in policy | Add aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent condition |

terraform-aws - IaC deployment of IAM resources
aws-ec2 - Instance profiles and roles
aws-lambda - Lambda execution roles
aws-ecs-fargate - ECS task and execution roles
access-review - Access auditing and governance

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AWS Iam Agent Skill

Install

The instruction itself

AWS IAM

When to Use This Skill

Prerequisites

IAM Policy Structure

Create and Manage Roles

Cross-Account Access

OIDC Federation for GitHub Actions

Permission Boundaries

IAM Access Analyzer and Auditing

Terraform IAM Role with OIDC

Service Control Policies (Organizations)

Troubleshooting

Related Skills

Other skills for the same job

How to use it