Strix•路径穿越与文件包含

Path Traversal / LFI / RFI

Improper file path handling and dynamic inclusion enable sensitive file disclosure, config/source leakage, SSRF pivots, and code execution. Treat all user-influenced paths, names, and schemes as untrusted; normalize and bind them to an allowlist or eliminate user control entirely.

Attack Surface

Path Traversal

• Read files outside intended roots via ../, encoding, normalization gaps

Local File Inclusion (LFI)

• Include server-side files into interpreters/templates

Remote File Inclusion (RFI)

• Include remote resources (HTTP/FTP/wrappers) for code execution

Archive Extraction

• Zip Slip: write outside target directory upon unzip/untar

Normalization Mismatches

• Server/proxy differences (nginx alias/root, upstream decoders)
• OS-specific paths: Windows separators, device names, UNC, NT paths, alternate data streams

High-Value Targets

Unix

• /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, application .env/config.yaml
• SSH keys, cloud creds, service configs/logs

Windows

• C:\Windows\win.ini, IIS/web.config, programdata configs, application logs

Application

• Source code templates and server-side includes
• Secrets in env dumps, framework caches

Reconnaissance

Surface Map

• HTTP params: file, path, template, include, page, view, download, export, report, log, dir, theme, lang
• Upload and conversion pipelines: image/PDF renderers, thumbnailers, office converters
• Archive extract endpoints and background jobs; imports with ZIP/TAR/GZ/7z
• Server-side template rendering (PHP/Smarty/Twig/Blade), email templates, CMS themes/plugins
• Reverse proxies and static file servers (nginx, CDN) in front of app handlers

Capability Probes

• Path traversal baseline: ../../etc/hosts and C:\Windows\win.ini
• Encodings: %2e%2e%2f, %252e%252e%252f, ..%2f, ..%5c, mixed UTF-8 (%c0%2e), Unicode dots and slashes
• Normalization tests: ..../, ..\\, ././, trailing dot/double dot segments; repeated decoding
• Absolute path acceptance: /etc/passwd, C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
• Server mismatch: /static/..;/../etc/passwd ("..;"), encoded slashes (%2F), double-decoding via upstream

Detection Channels

Direct

• Response body discloses file content (text, binary, base64)
• Error pages echo real paths

Error-Based

• Exception messages expose canonicalized paths or include() warnings with real filesystem locations

OAST

• RFI/LFI with wrappers that trigger outbound fetches (HTTP/DNS) to confirm inclusion/execution

Side Effects

• Archive extraction writes files unexpectedly outside target
• Verify with directory listings or follow-up reads

Key Vulnerabilities

Path Traversal Bypasses

Encodings

• Single/double URL-encoding, mixed case, overlong UTF-8, UTF-16, path normalization oddities

Mixed Separators

• / and \\ on Windows; // and \\\\ collapse differences across frameworks

Dot Tricks

• ....// (double dot folding), trailing dots (Windows), trailing slashes, appended valid extension

Absolute Path Injection

• Bypass joins by supplying a rooted path

Alias/Root Mismatch

• nginx alias without trailing slash with nested location allows ../ to escape
• Try /static/../etc/passwd and ";" variants (..;)

Upstream vs Backend Decoding

• Proxies/CDNs decoding %2f differently; test double-decoding and encoded dots

LFI Wrappers and Techniques

PHP Wrappers

• php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php (read source)
• zip://archive.zip#file.txt
• data://text/plain;base64
• expect:// (if enabled)

Log/Session Poisoning

• Inject PHP/templating payloads into access/error logs or session files then include them

Upload Temp Names

• Include temporary upload files before relocation; race with scanners

Proc and Caches

• /proc/self/environ and framework-specific caches for readable secrets

Legacy Tricks

• Null-byte (%00) truncation in older stacks; path length truncation

Template Engines

• PHP include/require; Smarty/Twig/Blade with dynamic template names
• Java/JSP/FreeMarker/Velocity; Node.js ejs/handlebars/pug engines
• Seek dynamic template resolution from user input (theme/lang/template)

RFI Conditions

Requirements

• Remote includes (allow_url_include/allow_url_fopen in PHP)
• Custom fetchers that eval/execute retrieved content
• SSRF-to-exec bridges

Protocol Handlers

• http, https, ftp; language-specific stream handlers

Exploitation

• Host a minimal payload that proves code execution
• Prefer OAST beacons or deterministic output over heavy shells
• Chain with upload or log poisoning when remote includes are disabled

Archive Extraction (Zip Slip)

• Files within archives containing ../ or absolute paths escape target extract directory
• Test multiple formats: zip/tar/tgz/7z
• Verify symlink handling and path canonicalization prior to write
• Impact: overwrite config/templates or drop webshells into served directories

Testing Methodology

• Inventory file operations - Downloads, previews, templates, logs, exports/imports, report engines, uploads, archive extractors
• Identify input joins - Path joins (base + user), include/require/template loads, resource fetchers, archive extract destinations
• Probe normalization - Separators, encodings, double-decodes, case, trailing dots/slashes
• Compare behaviors - Web server vs application behavior
• Escalate - From disclosure (read) to influence (write/extract/include), then to execution (wrapper/engine chains)

Validation

• Show a minimal traversal read proving out-of-root access (e.g., /etc/hosts) with a same-endpoint in-root control
• For LFI, demonstrate inclusion of a benign local file or harmless wrapper output (php://filter base64 of index.php)
• For RFI, prove remote fetch by OAST or controlled output; avoid destructive payloads
• For Zip Slip, create an archive with ../ entries and show write outside target (e.g., marker file read back)
• Provide before/after file paths, exact requests, and content hashes/lengths for reproducibility

False Positives

• In-app virtual paths that do not map to filesystem; content comes from safe stores (DB/object storage)
• Canonicalized paths constrained to an allowlist/root after normalization
• Wrappers disabled and includes using constant templates only
• Archive extractors that sanitize paths and enforce destination directories

Impact

• Sensitive configuration/source disclosure → credential and key compromise
• Code execution via inclusion of attacker-controlled content or overwritten templates
• Persistence via dropped files in served directories; lateral movement via revealed secrets
• Supply-chain impact when report/template engines execute attacker-influenced files

Pro Tips

• Compare content-length/ETag when content is masked; read small canonical files (hosts) to avoid noise
• Test proxy/CDN and app separately; decoding/normalization order differs, especially for %2f and %2e encodings
• For LFI, prefer php://filter base64 probes over destructive payloads; enumerate readable logs and sessions
• Validate extraction code with synthetic archives; include symlinks and deep ../ chains
• Use minimal PoCs and hard evidence (hashes, paths). Avoid noisy DoS against filesystems

Summary

Eliminate user-controlled paths where possible. Otherwise, resolve to canonical paths and enforce allowlists, forbid remote schemes, and lock down interpreters and extractors. Normalize consistently at the boundary closest to IO.