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Presend dependency checks MCP Server

answering

Presend dependency checks is answering right now. Last checked 13 min ago. It exposes 5 tools. Last commit 9 Oct 2026.

Check an npm/PyPI package before an AI agent installs it: 5 focused supply-chain tools.

Uptime history 9 days of history
9 days agonow
100.0%
Uptime 24h
91 of 91 checks
5
Tools
read from the server
40 ms
Response time
average over 24h
0
Stars
last commit 9 Oct 2026

What changed 4

Every tool that appeared, vanished or quietly changed what it asks for. Recorded since 4 October 2026. No other catalogue keeps this.

9 Oct a tool description was rewritten supply_chain_check
5 Oct 2 tool descriptions were rewritten supply_chain_check, vulnerability_check
4 Oct a tool description was rewritten vulnerability_check

What the code does

We read the source, 2 d ago · tools taken from the live server · rules ccca72095570

Capabilities

What this server is able to do. For an MCP server this is often the job itself — a terminal server runs commands because that is what it is for. Listed so you know what you are plugging in, not as an accusation.

Unsafe deserialization daily_seo.py:101, submit_all.py:62
            state = pickle.load(f)
Runs with shell=True research/guarddog/measure.py:86
        subprocess.check_call('mkdir -p /tmp/nhi && npm i -s --prefix /tmp/nhi npm-high-impact', shell=True)
Builds a database query by concatenation tools/landings/extract-text-from-image.html:78
      <li><strong>File picker</strong> — Click to browse and select an image</li>
      <li><strong>Paste from clipboard</strong> — Press Ctrl+V (or Cmd+V) anywhere on the page to paste a screenshot directly</li>
        toolsDiv.innerHTML = html;
<script async="" defer="" src="https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/api.js"></script>
Long encoded blob in source openapi.json:3836
            "schema": { "example": "CuYDCqEBCiUvY29zbW9zLnN0YWtpbmcudjFiZXRhMS5Nc2dVbmRlbGVnYXRlEngKLWNvc21vczFjNG16ajdhdTg3bm1qNHNzZWx4bGRwcWRrbjc5cHZ1ZXM2NHBtNxI0Y29zbW9zdmFsb3BlcjFmZjBkdzhrYXdzbnhrcmdqN3A2NWt2dzdqeHhha3lmOG41ODNneBoRCgV1YXRvbRIIMTAwMDc5OTgKnQEKJS9jb3Ntb3Muc3Rh…

Is this your server and something here is wrong? Tell us — corrections are free and do not require a plan.

This code can reach further than it looks

We found places where it runs commands, builds paths or queries from values it is given. None of that is a flaw by itself — it becomes one when the code changes, and code changes quietly between releases. We re-read it on every one.

Three servers free · no card

Connect this server

Endpoint below is the one we actually reach during checks — not the one copied from a README. Last verified 13 min ago.

run in your terminal
claude mcp add presend-deps --transport http https://presend.pages.dev/mcp-deps
~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "presend-deps": {
      "url": "https://presend.pages.dev/mcp-deps"
    }
  }
}
~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.presend-deps]
url = "https://presend.pages.dev/mcp-deps"
.cursor/mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "presend-deps": {
      "url": "https://presend.pages.dev/mcp-deps"
    }
  }
}
.vscode/mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "presend-deps": {
      "url": "https://presend.pages.dev/mcp-deps"
    }
  }
}

Available tools 5

Read directly from the server with tools/list, grouped by what they act on. If a tool disappears, we record the date.

maintainer
maintainer_change_check
Publisher-change analysis is npm only. Also reports whether the package exists (found) and its age (first_published, package_age_days, new_package if first published less than 30 days ago), for npm and for PyPI; on PyPI only existence and age are available. Flags a previously unseen human publisher taking over a package after 180+ days of inactivity, within the last 365 days (the event-stream attack pattern). npm trusted publishing (verified OIDC identity, not just a bot-like account name), pre-release, and handovers to a publisher who already maintains another widely used package (100k+ weekly downloads) are reported but not flagged. Does not detect hijacked existing accounts; a heuristic for review, not proof.
repo
repo_health_check
Maintenance signals for a GitHub repository given as owner/name: stars, forks, open issues, license, archived and fork flags, creation date and age, days since last push, topics. Use it to judge whether a dependency looks maintained or abandoned. For an npm or PyPI package whose repository you do not know, supply_chain_check resolves it from registry metadata and includes these signals. GitHub only; missing or private repositories return found: false.
supply
supply_chain_check
Call this before installing or adding a package (npm install, pip install, a new entry in a manifest), especially one whose name you recalled or that a model suggested. One-call risk check: combines vulnerability_check (OSV.dev), typosquat_check, maintainer_change_check (npm only) and repo_health_check (when the GitHub repo can be resolved) into one overall verdict. A package that does not exist on npm or PyPI gets overall_risk 'package_not_found': the name may be invented and should not be installed. A package first published less than 30 days ago gets the 'new_package' flag and overall_risk 'review_recommended': new packages are where invented and look-alike names get registered, so the name is worth confirming against the project's own documentation before installing (on PyPI the age is that of the oldest release still published; being new does not make a package malicious). Use the individual tools to investigate one signal. Vulnerabilities are checked for the given version, or the latest published one (version_checked, version_source). If a check could not run (rate limit, upstream error), it is listed in unavailable_checks and overall_risk is 'incomplete', never 'no_signals_found'. Also flags a version marked deprecated on npm or yanked on PyPI.
typosquat
typosquat_check
Call before installing a package whose name you typed or recalled. Checks whether an npm or PyPI package name is a near-miss of a well-known package (typosquatting), with an edit-distance threshold scaled to name length; names of 3 characters or fewer are not fuzzy-matched. Uses a curated list of popular names, so a clean result does not prove a package is safe. It does not check that the package exists: supply_chain_check does.
vulnerability
vulnerability_check
Checks a package (optionally a specific version) against OSV.dev for known vulnerabilities: npm, PyPI, Go, crates.io, Maven, RubyGems, Packagist and NuGet. For npm and PyPI, a name that does not exist returns found: false and vulnerable: null, never a clean result. Use supply_chain_check for a combined verdict.

Endpoints

URLTransportStateLatencyChecked
https://presend.pages.dev/mcp-deps streamable-http answering 85 ms 13 min ago

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Presend dependency checks — questions

Answers built from our own checks of this server.

What can Presend dependency checks do?
It exposes 5 tools, read directly from the server on our last check. Among them: maintainer_change_check, repo_health_check, supply_chain_check, typosquat_check, vulnerability_check. The full list with descriptions is on this page — we take it from the server itself via tools/list, not from a README. How MCP servers expose tools in the first place →
Is Presend dependency checks working right now?
We send a real MCP handshake every 15 minutes. Over the last 24 hours 91 of 91 checks got a reply (100.0%), average response time 40 ms. The bar chart above shows every period we have measured.
How do I connect Presend dependency checks?
Copy the ready config from this page — we generate it for Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Codex, Cursor and VS Code, each with the file path that client actually reads. It is a remote server, so there is nothing to install — the client connects to the address.
Does Presend dependency checks need an API key?
No. Presend dependency checks completed a full MCP handshake with us as an anonymous client and listed its tools without asking for anything. All 5 of them are readable on this page. This is what we observed, not what the docs claim.
How fast is Presend dependency checks?
It answers our handshake in 40 ms on average, which is faster than 97% of all working MCP servers we measure. That puts it in the quick quarter of the ecosystem. The comparison comes from our own checks across the whole registry, every 15 minutes.
Is Presend dependency checks open source?
Yes — it is published under the MIT licence, written in HTML and 0 stars on GitHub. The source link is on this page, so you can read exactly what it does with your data before you connect it.