Clipboard History MCP runs on your own machine — the client starts it, so there is no endpoint to ping. Last commit 2 Aug 2026.
Your clipboard, but Claude can read it. Type-classified, secret-encrypted. macOS + Linux.
What the code does
We read the source, 20 h ago · rules 3dff92dd89df
What this server is able to do. For an MCP server this is often the job itself — a terminal server runs commands because that is what it is for. Listed so you know what you are plugging in, not as an accusation.
std::path::PathBuf::from(&home).join(format!("Library/LaunchAgents/{}.plist", LABEL));
Is this your server and something here is wrong? Tell us — corrections are free and do not require a plan.
This code can reach further than it looks
We found places where it runs commands, builds paths or queries from values it is given. None of that is a flaw by itself — it becomes one when the code changes, and code changes quietly between releases. We re-read it on every one.
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Clipboard History MCP — questions
Answers built from our own checks of this server.