Tremelay runs on your own machine — the client starts it, so there is no endpoint to ping. Last commit 16 Oct 2026.
Local MCP broker: agents call credentials through a daemon without seeing secrets.
What the code does
We read the source, 4 d ago · rules 995398eba69f
What this server is able to do. For an MCP server this is often the job itself — a terminal server runs commands because that is what it is for. Listed so you know what you are plugging in, not as an accusation.
path := filepath.Join(dir, "."+id+".restore-incomplete")
Is this your server and something here is wrong? Tell us — corrections are free and do not require a plan.
This code can reach further than it looks
We found places where it runs commands, builds paths or queries from values it is given. None of that is a flaw by itself — it becomes one when the code changes, and code changes quietly between releases. We re-read it on every one.
Alternatives to Tremelay
same job, measured the same wayLet AI agents use secrets without seeing them: inject into a command, redact the output.
Call third-party APIs from agents without leaking secrets. SSRF blocked, per-key quotas.
Zero-Trust PII & secrets sanitizer for AI agents with in-memory local redaction.
Run commands on your remote test machines over SSH without the agent ever seeing a secret.
Save and use 1Password secrets locally without exposing plaintext to AI agents.
Write secrets into .env without the agent ever seeing the value - Windows masked dialog (繁中 UI)
The local security layer for coding agents: secret redaction, injection checks and an MCP proxy.
Let AI agents use secrets without seeing them: masked output, every use approved in JFSecure.
Tremelay — questions
Answers built from our own checks of this server.