mcpbeat

Sast Report

utkusen/sast-report

>- Consolidate all SAST vulnerability results from the sast/ folder into a single final report ranked by severity and confidentiality impact. Reads all *-results.md files and produces sast/final-report.md. Run after all vulnerability detection skills complete. Use when asked to generate a final report, consolidate findings, or summarize security results.

2k tokens
context cost
the whole folder, loaded on every use
1
files
instructions only
0
copies elsewhere
how many repositories repackaged it
1251
stars on the repo
on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository
npx skills add https://github.com/utkusen/sast-skills --skill sast-report

What it tells the agent to use

found in the instruction text
Task spawns other agents

The instruction itself

9 sections, as written by the author

Final Security Report Generation

You are consolidating all completed SAST vulnerability scan results into a single prioritized security report.

Prerequisites: At least one sast/*-results.md file must exist. Run the vulnerability detection skills first if they don't.


What to Include

Only include findings with these classifications from each result file:

  • [VULNERABLE]
  • [LIKELY VULNERABLE]

Exclude [NOT VULNERABLE] and [NEEDS MANUAL REVIEW] findings from the main report body (count them only in the summary).


Severity Ranking

Assign each finding a severity tier — Critical, High, Medium, or Low — using the table below as your baseline. Adjust up or down based on context (e.g., an IDOR that exposes financial records is High, not Medium).

| Vulnerability Class | Default Severity |

|---------------------|------------------|

| RCE via command injection, eval, or unsafe deserialization | Critical |

| SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) | Critical |

| SQLi on authentication endpoints | Critical |

| JWT algorithm confusion (alg:none, RS256→HS256) | Critical |

| File upload leading to code execution (webshell) | Critical |

| SQLi with full data extraction capability | High–Critical |

| GraphQL injection (user-controlled operation document enabling unauthorized fields or gateway abuse) | High–Critical |

| XXE with file read or internal SSRF | High–Critical |

| Missing authentication on sensitive endpoints | High–Critical |

| SSRF reaching internal services or cloud metadata | High |

| Path traversal reading sensitive or config files | High |

| File upload with stored content accessible to others | High |

| IDOR on PII, financial, or health data | High |

| XSS (stored/persistent) | High |

| JWT with missing or bypassable claim validation | Medium–High |

| Missing authentication on lower-sensitivity endpoints | Medium |

| IDOR on non-sensitive data | Medium |

| XSS (reflected or DOM) | Medium |

| Business logic flaws (price manipulation, workflow bypass) | Medium |

| Information disclosure of non-sensitive data | Low |

Confidentiality as a tiebreaker: When two findings share the same baseline severity, rank higher the one with greater confidentiality impact — i.e., the greater its potential to expose sensitive user data, credentials, or system internals.


Execution

Perform all steps in-session (no subagents needed).

Step 1: Discover result files

Check which of these files exist in sast/:

  • idor-results.md
  • sqli-results.md
  • ssrf-results.md
  • xss-results.md
  • rce-results.md
  • xxe-results.md
  • fileupload-results.md
  • pathtraversal-results.md
  • ssti-results.md
  • jwt-results.md
  • missingauth-results.md
  • businesslogic-results.md
  • graphql-results.md

Also read sast/architecture.md if it exists (use it for the project name and context when writing severity rationale).

Step 2: Read and extract findings

Read each existing result file. For every finding classified as [VULNERABLE] or [LIKELY VULNERABLE], extract:

  • Finding title
  • Vulnerability type (derived from the source file)
  • File / endpoint affected
  • Issue description
  • Impact description
  • Proof / code path
  • Remediation
  • Dynamic test steps (if present)

Step 3: Score and sort

Assign each finding a severity level (Critical / High / Medium / Low) using the table above. Sort all findings:

  • Critical first, then High, Medium, Low
  • Within each tier, sort by confidentiality impact (highest first)

Step 4: Write sast/final-report.md

Use exactly this output format:


# Security Assessment Final Report

**Project**: [name from architecture.md, or infer from codebase]
**Generated**: [current date]
**Scans completed**: [comma-separated list of scan types that had result files]

---

## Executive Summary

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | N |
| High     | N |
| Medium   | N |
| Low      | N |
| **Total confirmed findings** | **N** |

Scans with no confirmed vulnerabilities: [list]
Findings requiring manual review: N (see individual result files for details)

---

## Vulnerability Index

| # | Title | Type | Severity | Endpoint / File |
|---|-------|------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | ... | RCE | Critical | `POST /api/exec` |
| 2 | ... | SQLi | High | `GET /api/users` |

---

## Findings

### Critical

#### [Finding Title] — [Vuln Type]

- **Source scan**: `sast/[type]-results.md`
- **Classification**: Vulnerable *(or "Likely Vulnerable")*
- **Endpoint / File**: ...
- **Severity rationale**: [1–2 sentences explaining why this is Critical, with focus on confidentiality and integrity impact]
- **Issue**: ...
- **Impact**: ...
- **Proof**:

[code path or evidence from original finding]

- **Remediation**: ...
- **Dynamic Test**:

[curl command or step-by-step test instructions from original finding]


---

### High

[Same structure as Critical section]

---

### Medium

[Same structure]

---

### Low

[Same structure]

---

## Appendix: Scan Coverage

| Scan | Result File | Status |
|------|-------------|--------|
| IDOR | `sast/idor-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| SQLi | `sast/sqli-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| SSRF | `sast/ssrf-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| XSS | `sast/xss-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| RCE | `sast/rce-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| XXE | `sast/xxe-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| File Upload | `sast/fileupload-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| Path Traversal | `sast/pathtraversal-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| SSTI | `sast/ssti-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| JWT | `sast/jwt-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| Missing Auth | `sast/missingauth-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| Business Logic | `sast/businesslogic-results.md` | Completed / Not run |
| GraphQL injection | `sast/graphql-results.md` | Completed / Not run |

Important Reminders

  • Include ONLY [VULNERABLE] and [LIKELY VULNERABLE] findings in the Findings section.
  • Mark [LIKELY VULNERABLE] findings clearly: append ⚠ Likely Vulnerable after the finding title.
  • Preserve all details from the original findings — do not summarize or truncate Proof, Remediation, or Dynamic Test sections.
  • If sast/architecture.md exists, use it to enrich the severity rationale with application-specific context (e.g., "this endpoint handles payment data, making confidentiality impact Critical").
  • Omit severity sections entirely (e.g., the ### Low heading) if no findings fall in that tier.

How to use it

Copy the folder

Take utkusen/sast-report from the repository into ~/.claude/skills for personal use, or into .claude/skills inside a project.

Check the name does not clash

The agent identifies a skill by the name field in its header. Two skills with the same name cannot sit side by side — one of them will be ignored.