Offensive Osint

Offensive OSINT — External Red-Team Arsenal

> v3.0 — Refactored 2026-05-02 from a 4,168-line monolith into a lean SKILL.md (~400 lines) plus 15 modular reference files in references/. Detail content loads on demand — Claude reads only the reference files relevant to the current task.

0. When to use / When NOT

Use this skill when:

• You need concrete probe paths, wordlists, regexes, payloads, scoring rules, or tool URLs.
• You're executing reconnaissance and need the actual technical reference (vs. methodology).
• You're building a recon automation and need specific lists to seed it.

Do NOT use this skill when:

• The user is asking for active exploitation, post-exploitation, or anything past reconnaissance.
• The user is asking for defensive / blue-team detections.
• The target's authorization isn't established — see §1.

1. Authorization & Legal Posture

For assets the operator owns or has written authorization to assess. Soft scope check before acting against an unverified third-party target — see methodology skill §1 for the full posture.

2. Confidence Levels

• TENTATIVE — plausible based on indirect evidence (snippet-only dork match, single-source asset, inferred email pattern).
• FIRM — directly observed (subdomain resolves, HEAD-confirmed bucket exists, banner returned).
• CONFIRMED — verified via independent corroboration OR direct verification (live PMAK validation, multiple sources agree, listable bucket with object retrieval).

3. Output Format Conventions

Findings should carry: id, module, asset_key, category, severity (info/low/medium/high/critical), confidence, title, description, evidence (url + UTC timestamp + sha256 + raw ≤ 2 KiB), references, remediation. UTC timestamps everywhere.

4. Source Hygiene & Citations

URL + UTC timestamp + SHA-256 + tool version + run_id, every artifact. PNG screenshots, JSONL run logs, raw HTTP captures capped at 2 KiB body.

5. Do NOT

• Don't paste creds/PII/session tokens into cloud LLMs.
• Don't run destructive probes outside DEEP/--aggressive.
• Don't use validated credentials for anything except read-only liveness check.
• Don't single-source attribute.
• Don't assume vendor labels are ground truth.

6. General OSINT (curated tool refs)

• OSINT Bookmarks — comprehensive bookmarks.
• OSINT Framework — tool/resource directory.
• IntelTechniques Tools — investigative suite.
• Bellingcat Toolkit — investigative journalism.
• CyberSudo OSINT Toolkit — OSINT websites list.
• Google Dorks — efficient Google searching.
• Distributed Denial of Secrets — leaked datasets.
• Country-Specific Resources — country-targeted OSINT.

How to use this skill

This skill is a lean operational index. Most concrete data (wordlists, regexes, dorks, endpoint catalogs, severity examples) lives in the references/ subfolder, organized by topic.

Workflow when this skill triggers:

• Read this SKILL.md to anchor on principles (§0-5), scoring rubrics (§20-21), attack-path templates (§39), and the references index below.
• For task-specific data, read only the reference file(s) you need — do NOT pull all 15. Each reference is self-contained.
• Use the bug-bounty skill for the local toolkit at ~/security-research/bug-bounty-resources/ and osint-methodology for the planning framework.

Loading rules of thumb:

• Single-class question (e.g., "what's the regex for AWS keys?") → load secret-patterns.md only.
• Multi-class engagement (e.g., "do an external recon on target.com") → load probes-and-wordlists.md first, then add others as the engagement narrows.
• Severity / triage question → load severity-matrix.md.

References Index

| File | Coverage | Trigger phrases |

|---|---|---|

| probes-and-wordlists.md | API/Swagger/GraphQL paths, cloud-bucket arsenal, JS guess-paths, vendor & cloud-native fingerprints, K8s/CI-CD exposure, doc/wiki leaks, WHOIS/RDAP, DNS catalog, Wayback CDX, copy-paste curl probes, email security analysis, origin/CDN bypass | swagger discovery, graphql introspection, subdomain takeover, cloud bucket enum, S3/GCS/Azure enum, kubernetes exposure, CI CD exposure, vendor fingerprint, WHOIS RDAP, Wayback CDX, copy paste probes, curl one-liner |

| identity-fabric.md | Concrete endpoints for Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML, M365 deep (Teams federation, SharePoint, OneDrive), GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration, user-enum patterns | identity fabric, SSO discovery, IdP fingerprinting, okta enum, entra enum, azure AD enum, ADFS enum, SAML metadata, Microsoft 365 deep, Teams federation, SharePoint enum, OneDrive enum, graphql field suggestion |

| secret-patterns.md | 48-pattern secret-regex catalog (AWS, GCP, GitHub PATs, Stripe, Slack, JWT, private keys, Anthropic/OpenAI/HuggingFace, Cloudflare, DigitalOcean, npm, PyPI, Docker Hub, Atlassian, DataDog, Sentry, ngrok) with severity & FP notes | secret scanning, secret leak, leaked credential, JWT triage, AWS key triage, Anthropic API key, OpenAI API key |

| secret-validators.md | 9 read-only secret validators + post-discovery enumeration workflows for AWS/GitHub/Slack/Postman/JWT/Anthropic/OpenAI/npm/Atlassian/DataDog | secret validation, post discovery workflow, AWS key triage, JWT triage |

| dork-corpus.md | 80+ Google/Bing/DDG dork templates across 9 categories + 13 GitHub code-search dorks tailored for targets | google dorking, bing dorking, github dorking, dork corpus |

| recon-stack.md | Subdomain-source stack (passive & active), infrastructure & attack-surface OSINT (Shodan/Censys/crt.sh/JARM/favicon mmh3), TLS deep audit, reverse DNS, IPv6 enumeration | subdomain enumeration, certificate transparency, crt.sh, shodan recon, censys recon, JARM, favicon mmh3, TLS deep audit, JA3 JA4, reverse DNS sweep, IPv6 enumeration |

| breach-and-credentials.md | Breach & leak data sources (HudsonRock, HIBP, DeHashed, IntelX, infostealer logs), email-pattern inference, email-harvest source stack | breach lookup, have I been pwned, HudsonRock cavalier, infostealer, dehashed, intelx, email harvest |

| people-osint.md | Search engines, username & email investigation, people search, phone OSINT, social media, public records & company info | username investigation, people search, phone OSINT, social media OSINT, public records |

| saas-public-surfaces.md | Postman public workspace search (verified endpoint), Stack Exchange OSINT sweep, public SaaS dork stack (Notion, Confluence, Trello) | postman workspace, stack exchange OSINT, Notion public, Confluence anonymous, Trello board |

| specialized-osint.md | Threat intel & IOCs, cryptocurrency OSINT, media intelligence, geospatial intelligence, regional search engines, Telegram & messaging intelligence | threat intel, IOCs, cryptocurrency OSINT, media intelligence, geospatial OSINT, regional search, Telegram intelligence |

| recon-techniques.md | LinkedIn employee enumeration, job-posting tech-stack analysis, Slack/Discord/Telegram workspace discovery, package-registry leak hunting (npm/PyPI/Docker Hub/Quay/GHCR), sat imagery for physical recon | LinkedIn enumeration, job posting tech stack, Slack workspace discovery, Discord server discovery, npm token leak, PyPI token leak, Docker Hub leak, sat imagery physical recon |

| severity-matrix.md | 80+ worked examples mapping observed conditions → finding severity (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/INFO) | severity decision, finding severity, severity matrix |

| sector-notes.md | Recon notes for healthcare (DICOM), finance (SWIFT), ICS/SCADA (Modbus/BACnet), IoT, government | sector specific recon, healthcare DICOM, finance SWIFT, ICS SCADA, Modbus, BACnet |

| tooling-install.md | Quick-install one-liners for Subfinder, Amass, httpx, nuclei, gau, katana, gowitness, dnsx, mapcidr, naabu, sslyze, testssl.sh, etc. | tooling install, install subfinder, install nuclei, install httpx |

| helpers-and-automation.md | AI-assisted OSINT, archiving & evidence preservation, automation & workflow patterns, cross-module sidecar coordination, runnable secret_scan.py / h1_reference.py / dashboard.py helper notes | AI-assisted OSINT, evidence preservation, automation, sidecar, hacktivity reference, recon console |

20. Endpoint Interest Score — 0–100 rubric

For every classified endpoint (§22 in methodology skill), apply this rubric:

| Signal | Points | Conditions |

|---|---|---|

| Unauth write | +40 | POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH endpoint returns 200/201/202/204 anonymously. |

| Open GraphQL introspection | +35 | __schema query returns full type list anonymously. |

| Verb tampering bypass | +30 | OPTIONS reveals method not documented; that method is accessible. |

| Reflected CORS + credentials | +25 | Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects request Origin AND Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. |

| Sensitive keyword in path | +20 | Path matches one of: admin, internal, debug, user, password, token, key, export, upload, backup, config, secret, private, delete, purge, wipe. |

| Schema leak in error | +20 | Response body contains stack trace, ORM error class, framework signature (e.g., ActiveRecord::RecordNotFound, org.hibernate.exception.*, django.db.utils.IntegrityError). |

| API key in URL | +15 | Path or query string contains api_key=, apikey=, token=, access_token=. |

| Wildcard CORS | +10 | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. |

| Missing rate-limit headers | +10 | No RateLimit-* / X-RateLimit-* headers; no Retry-After after rapid requests. |

Thresholds:

| Score | Severity |

|---|---|

| ≥ 90 | CRITICAL |

| 70–89 | HIGH |

| 50–69 | MEDIUM |

| 25–49 | LOW |

| < 25 | INFO |

For score ≥ 70, attach an attack_path_hint in evidence (see §29).

21. Mobile App Ownership Confidence — 0–100 rubric

Before running deep APK static analysis, score whether the discovered app actually belongs to the target. Threshold: ≥70 = accept.

| Signal | Points |

|---|---|

| Package reverse-DNS matches target domain (e.g., com.acme.android ⟂ acme.com) | +40 |

| Developer email is <anything>@<target-domain> | +25 |

| Developer website URL is the target domain (or a confirmed sibling brand domain) | +20 |

| App name contains a brand keyword from operator-supplied brand list | +10 |

| App has ≥ minimum review-score threshold (default 20 reviews) | +5 |

Apps below threshold are tagged mobile_review_pending and shown but not analyzed. Operator can re-score with --mobile-ownership-threshold 50 for noisier collection.

39. Attack-Path Hint Patterns

When emitting a HIGH/CRITICAL API endpoint finding (score ≥ 70), include a one-sentence attack_path_hint in evidence so the operator knows where to start exploiting. Templates:

| Trigger | Attack-path hint |

|---|---|

| Unauth POST / PUT / DELETE | *"Unauthenticated {method} {path} — try IDOR + privilege escalation; check whether numeric IDs are sequential or guessable."* |

| Open GraphQL introspection | *"Open GraphQL introspection on {path} — enumerate mutations, look for createUser, setRole, transferFunds-shaped names; pivot to broken-auth or business-logic flaws."* |

| Reflected CORS + creds | *"Reflected CORS with credentials on {path} — host CSRF page on attacker-controlled origin; victim's browser will leak {sensitive-data-hint}."* |

| Wildcard CORS + sensitive | *"Wildcard CORS on {path} returning user-tied data without creds — exfiltrate via cross-origin fetch from any page victim visits."* |

| Verb tampering | *"Verb tampering: {hidden-method} allowed on documented-{visible-method}-only endpoint → likely missing-method-check authz bug; try {hidden-method} {path} with valid auth."* |

| API key in URL | *"API key in URL: ?{param}=... — token leaks to access logs, browser history, Referer headers, third-party CDNs. Check Wayback / Google for cached copies."* |

| Schema leak in error | *"Schema leak in error response — framework signature {framework} exposed; map to known {framework} vulns and craft targeted payloads."* |

| Sensitive keyword | *"Path contains '{keyword}' — review for direct object reference, mass-assignment, or hidden admin functionality."* |

| Open RTDB Firebase | *"Open Firebase RTDB at https://{project}.firebaseio.com/.json — read everything, then test write at /<random-key>.json with PUT to gauge ACL scope."* |

| Listable cloud bucket | *"Listable {provider} bucket {bucket} — recursive object listing + content-type analysis; look for backups, logs, customer data, AWS keys in JSON configs."* |

| .git exposed | *"Exposed .git/config on {host} — reconstruct repository with git-dumper or githacker; full source history."* |

| .env exposed | *"Exposed .env on {host} — grep for _KEY, _SECRET, _TOKEN, _PASSWORD; validate all credentials read-only via §23 validators."* |

| /actuator/env | *"Spring Boot /actuator/env exposed — dump environment variables; look for spring.datasource.password, JWT secrets, cloud creds."* |

| /actuator/heapdump | *"Spring Boot /actuator/heapdump exposed — download HPROF, run jhat or VisualVM, search for cleartext secrets in heap strings."* |

| Open Elasticsearch | *"Open Elasticsearch on {host}:9200 — /_cat/indices?v for index list; sample documents from each high-value index; test write to /test-idx/_doc to gauge ACL."* |

| Open Redis | *"Open Redis on {host}:6379 — INFO, KEYS *, sample reads; check for write access via CONFIG SET then BGSAVE to write authorized_keys."* |

| Open MongoDB | *"Open MongoDB on {host}:27017 — show dbs, show collections, sample find queries; check user collection for password hashes."* |

| Subdomain takeover | *"CNAME for {host} points to unclaimed {provider} resource → register {takeover-target} on {provider} to serve content from {host}; pivot to phishing or content injection on the trusted domain."* |

| Open kubelet | *"Open kubelet on {host}:10250 — GET /pods to list; POST /run/<ns>/<pod>/<container> for in-container exec without K8s API auth."* |

| Open etcd | *"Open etcd on {host}:2379 — etcdctl get / --prefix --keys-only for full cluster state; secrets stored under /registry/secrets/."* |

| K8s API anonymous | *"Kubernetes API on {host}:6443 with anonymous-auth — kubectl --server=https://{host}:6443 --insecure-skip-tls-verify get pods --all-namespaces."* |

| Citrix unpatched | *"Citrix NetScaler version {ver} on {host} — vulnerable to CVE-{cve} (KEV-listed); see vendor advisory; do not exploit but flag for client immediate patching."* |

| F5 BIG-IP TMUI exposed | *"F5 BIG-IP TMUI on {host} reachable; CVE-2022-1388 / CVE-2023-46747 KEV applicable; advise immediate patching to vendor-released hotfix."* |

| VMware vCenter accessible | *"vCenter at {host} accessible without VPN; CVE-2021-21972 RCE if unpatched; check version banner."* |

| Cloud function URL unauth | *"AWS Lambda Function URL at {url} accessible anonymously — review IAM auth configuration; if unauthenticated by design, audit input validation aggressively."* |

| npm typosquat candidate | *"Package name {candidate} is unregistered + similar to target's published {official} — typosquat takeover risk; advise client to defensively register."* |

| DMARC missing/permissive | *"DMARC p=none on {domain} — spoof of {anything}@{domain} deliverable to recipients; recommend enforcement to p=quarantine or p=reject after observing reports."* |

| Live AI API key (Anthropic/OpenAI) | *"Validated sk-{provider}-... key with model access — quota cost can be exfiltrated; rotate immediately + audit usage logs in provider console."* |

| Public Slack invite link | *"Slack workspace invite link discoverable via search engine — anyone can join the workspace without approval; trivially access internal channels."* |

| Open Docker registry | *"Public Docker registry at {host} — GET /v2/_catalog lists images; pull and scan layers for embedded secrets."* |

| Telegram bot token live | *"Telegram bot token validated — getUpdates reveals bot recipients (admin chats); if getMe shows bot is in channels, full message read access."* |

| Sourcemap with sourcesContent[] | *"Sourcemap on {host} includes embedded original sources — full frontend code reconstructable; grep for inline secrets and internal hostnames."* |

49. Skill Self-Test

Drop these prompts into a fresh Claude session to verify the skill loads correctly.

• *"What paths should I probe to find Swagger or OpenAPI specs on a webapp?"* → §16.1.
• *"Give me the GraphQL introspection query I should POST."* → §16.2.
• *"What are the high-risk ports to flag from a Shodan scan?"* → §16.3.
• *"Show me the secret regex catalog."* → §17 (48 patterns) + §48 (runnable Python).
• *"How do I score an API endpoint by attack interest?"* → §20.
• *"Validate a leaked Postman API key — what URL?"* → §23.1.
• *"Give me dorks for pastebin/gist/ghostbin leaks for a target."* → §18.3.
• *"What endpoints fingerprint a Microsoft Entra tenant?"* → §22.1 + §22.8 for M365 deep.
• *"How do I score whether a discovered Android app belongs to my target?"* → §21.

10. *"What attack-path hint when I find unauth POST on /api/users?"* → §39 (first row).

11. *"Curl one-liner to test for /actuator/env."* → §16.13.

12. *"Show me the GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration trick when introspection is disabled."* → §22.9.

13. *"Found a hard-coded JWT in JS. Walk me through full triage."* → §23.12 (JWT workflow).

14. *"Generate cloud bucket candidates for <Client Brand Ltd> with subdomains api/billing/hr."* → §16.8.

15. *"How do I find Microsoft 365 Teams federation status + SharePoint subdomains?"* → §22.8.

16. *"Probe paths for Citrix Netscaler / F5 BIG-IP / Pulse Secure."* → §16.16.

17. *"Find the origin behind Cloudflare on target.example."* → §16.15 + companion methodology §27.

18. *"What ports/paths probe for Kubernetes/etcd/kubelet exposure?"* → §16.18.

19. *"Audit acme.com's SPF/DMARC for spoof feasibility."* → §16.14.

20. *"List wordlist sources for subdomain bruteforce + content discovery."* → §27.1.

21. *"Run reverse-DNS sweep across a /22 the target owns."* → §28.5.

22. *"Validate an OpenAI API key without burning quota."* → §23.6 + §23.12.

23. *"Find leaked secrets across npm/PyPI/Docker Hub for the target."* → §44.

24. *"How do I enumerate target employees on LinkedIn for a phishing list?"* → §41.

25. *"What's a Slack invite link enumeration technique?"* → §43.1.

26. *"What's the EPSS score and KEV status for CVE-2024-3400?"* → §29.2.

27. *"What modern AI API keys (Anthropic / OpenAI / HuggingFace / Cloudflare) match catalog patterns?"* → §17 rows 30–48.

28. *"Severity matrix for android:debuggable=true on prod app?"* → §40.

29. *"Install commands for the standard recon toolkit (subfinder/httpx/nuclei/etc.)?"* → §46.

30. *"For a healthcare engagement, what additional ports / protocols matter?"* → §47.1.

31. *"Pull HudsonRock breach corpus for target.com via direct API (no UI)."* → §15.0.1.

32. *"Run the full §16.14 email security audit from a Windows box (PowerShell)."* → §16.14 PowerShell parallel.

33. *"crt.sh just 502'd. What's the fallback chain?"* → §27.0.1.

34. *"Bulk IP → ASN lookup for 200 IPs without burning bgpview rate limit."* → §28.1 (Cymru bulk).

35. *"Common-prefix subdomain sweep for target.example covering vpn / api / staging / portal / intranet."* → §16.24.

36. *"Legacy mail (mail.<domain>) is NXDOMAIN today but breach corpus has employee URLs against it. What's the finding?"* → §15.2 legacy-mail-decommissioned pattern.

37. *"Confirm M365 tenancy when MX is wrapped by Mimecast (so MX doesn't reveal underlying mail platform)."* → §22.1 autodiscover IP correlation + §16.22 autodiscover-as-confirmation.

38. *"DMARC RUA points to kdmarc.com — what does that tell me?"* → §16.14 DMARC reporting-vendor table.

39. *"SharePoint HEAD probe returns HTTP 200. Does that mean anonymous access is granted?"* → §22.8 (no — tenant exists, not anonymous access; distinguish).

40. *"Wayback *.js query returned empty for a brochure-ware site. Pivot?"* → §16.23 legacy-app pivot (.asp / .php / .jsp / .cfm / .aspx).

50. Changelog

• v2.1.1 (2026-04-27) — battle-test gap fixes from real-engagement smoke run. Added: §15.0.1 HudsonRock Cavalier direct-API recipe (curl + PowerShell, full JSON shape, free-tier redaction caveats, rate-limit guidance). §15.2 expanded with legacy-mail-decommissioned escalation pattern (NXDOMAIN legacy mail + breach corpus + autodiscover-confirmed cloud migration → CRITICAL SSO_EXPOSURE). §16.14 expanded with DMARC reporting-vendor table (Kratikal kdmarc / dmarcian / Valimail / Agari / EasyDMARC / DMARC Analyzer / Postmark) + full Windows/PowerShell parallel for the entire email security audit + caveat that PS 5.1 Resolve-DnsName -Type CAA errors (use PS 7+ or nslookup -type=CAA). §16.22 expanded TXT verification token catalog with 17 new tokens (zscaler-verification, cloudflare-verify, autosect, cisco-site-verification, mscid, _amazonses, salesforce-domain-verification, workday/shopify/klaviyo/mailchimp/hubspot/zendesk/freshworks/intercom/loom/miro/gitlab) + new "Autodiscover-as-confirmation" pattern for M365 detection when MX is wrapped by Mimecast/Proofpoint/Barracuda. §22.1 added passive Autodiscover IP correlation pattern with Microsoft Exchange Online IP ranges. §22.8 added clarification: SharePoint HEAD HTTP 200 = tenant exists, NOT anonymous access granted (operators commonly misread). New §16.23 legacy-app pivot block (when Wayback *.js returns empty for brochure-ware sites, pivot to .asp/.php/.jsp/.cfm/.aspx/.json/.xml/.yml/.ini/.conf — with full broad-sweep one-liner). New §16.24 Common-Prefix Subdomain Sweep — formalized active prefix-probe technique with 100+ ordered prefix list, PowerShell + bash + puredns recipes, and real-engagement validation note (passive enum misses 20-40% of high-value subdomains; always pair with active prefix probe). §27.0.1 added crt.sh fallback chain (Censys, CertSpotter, Calidog, Subfinder, OTX, ThreatMiner, URLScan, Anubis-DB) with PowerShell wrapper that retries crt.sh 3× then falls back to Subfinder. §28.1 added Bulk IP→ASN recipes (Cymru bulk WHOIS, RIPEstat, bgp.tools, IPinfo Lite) + caveat that bgpview.io API has aggressive rate limits unsuitable for bulk. §40 severity matrix gained 8 rows: vendor procurement portal exposed + breach corpus hits (HIGH), PII-collection portal over plain HTTP (HIGH), decommissioned legacy mail + breach + cloud migration (CRITICAL), public-facing intranet without VPN (MEDIUM), staging/preprod publicly resolvable (MEDIUM), vpn.<domain> resolves but vendor unknown (INFO escalating to HIGH-CRITICAL on KEV match), DMARC RUA → third-party vendor (INFO). §49 self-test expanded from 30 → 40 prompts targeting all new content.
• v2.1 (2026-04-27) — comprehensive expansion based on 32-test smoke-test gap analysis. Added: copy-paste curl probes for every check (§16.13), email security analysis with SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC parsing + SaaS tenant inference (§16.14), origin discovery / CDN bypass via DNS history + cert SAN + favicon hash + JARM + Host-header probe (§16.15), vendor product fingerprints for Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/PaloAlto/Cisco/VMware/Exchange + KEV CVE associations (§16.16), cloud-native service URL fingerprints — Lambda Function URLs, Cloud Run, Cloud Functions, Azure Functions, Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Workers, etc. (§16.17), container & Kubernetes exposure (kubelet, etcd, K8s API, dashboard, Helm Tiller, container registries) (§16.18), CI/CD platform exposure (Jenkins deeper, GitLab, GitHub Actions, CircleCI, TeamCity, Argo CD, Spinnaker) (§16.19), documentation/wiki leak paths (Notion, Confluence, Trello, Miro, Lucidchart, Figma, ReadTheDocs, GitBook, Slab, Coda, etc.) (§16.20), WHOIS/RDAP/historical-WHOIS recipes + reverse-WHOIS pivots (§16.21), DNS record catalog with TXT verification token table → SaaS tenant inference (§16.22), Wayback CDX deep usage with all filter parameters (§16.23). Expanded: §17 secret catalog from 29 → 48 patterns adding modern AI API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI legacy + project, HuggingFace), infra (Cloudflare, DigitalOcean), package registries (npm, PyPI, Docker Hub), SaaS (Atlassian, Linear), observability (New Relic, DataDog, Sentry DSN), bot tokens (Discord, Telegram), and ngrok. Expanded §18 dork corpus from 50+ → 80+ with internal-tool exposure (Splunk/Grafana/Kibana/Argo CD/Sonarqube/Confluence/Jira/GitLab/Gitea), backup-file extensions, and sector-specific dorks (healthcare/finance/gov). Added §22.8 Microsoft 365 deep enumeration (Teams federation, SharePoint subdomain probe, OneDrive personal-site probe, OAuth client_id discovery, device-code phishing target check, Power Platform). Added §22.9 GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration recipe + alias batching, query-depth bypass, subscription enumeration, batched-query bypass. Added §23.5–23.9 read-only validators for Anthropic, OpenAI, npm, Atlassian, DataDog (5 new). Added §23.12 post-discovery enumeration workflows (AWS IAM enum, GitHub PAT scope/repo enum, Slack workspace enum, JWT full triage with algorithm-confusion + brute-force + none-bypass, Postman PMAK workspace enum, Anthropic + OpenAI usage enum, generic key provenance enum). Pinned §24 Postman search endpoint with verified shape + DevTools fallback recipe. Added §27.1 wordlist sources (Assetnote, SecLists, jhaddix, OneListForAll, raft-large-words, fuzzdb, etc.) + size guidance. Added §28.4 TLS deep audit (sslyze + testssl.sh + nmap + JA3/JA4 + cipher/protocol/cert checks). Added §28.5 reverse DNS sweep + IPv6 enumeration + BGP route observation. Added §29.2 vulnerability prioritization data sources (NVD/EPSS/CISA KEV/ExploitDB/Metasploit/InTheWild/OpenCVE/Trickest CVE+POC mapping/OSV.dev/VulnCheck KEV) + bulk prioritization workflow. Expanded §39 attack-path hints with 15 more templates (open kubelet/etcd, K8s API anonymous, Citrix/F5/vCenter/Cloud Function unauth, npm typosquat, DMARC missing, live AI keys, Slack invite, sourcemap with sourcesContent). Expanded §40 severity matrix with 30 more worked examples covering Kubernetes/container, vendor products with KEV CVEs, M365/cloud-native, CI/CD misconfig, documentation leaks, email-security gaps, AI/package-registry credentials, TLS issues. Added §41 LinkedIn employee enumeration tradecraft (search techniques + role inference + email-pattern derivation + sock-puppet considerations). Added §42 job posting tech-stack analysis (sources + extraction + tooling). Added §43 Slack/Discord/Telegram/Mattermost workspace discovery. Added §44 package registry leak hunting (npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Cargo/Packagist/NuGet/Maven Central + workflow + typosquat surveillance). Added §45 sat imagery for physical recon (sources + extraction + LinkedIn/Glassdoor/Instagram/conference intel + vehicle/fleet intel). Added §46 tooling quick-install (subdomain, HTTP probing, vuln scanning, content discovery, JS extraction, Wayback, cloud, identity, mobile, TLS, utilities, frameworks). Added §47 sector-specific recon notes (healthcare DICOM/HL7/FHIR/EHR + finance SWIFT/FIX/Bloomberg/banking middleware + ICS-SCADA Modbus/BACnet/S7/DNP3 + IoT MQTT/CoAP/UPnP + government FedRAMP/FISMA + maritime/aviation/auto). Renumbered Runnable Helper → §48, Self-Test → §49 (refreshed for v2.1), Changelog → §50.
• v2.0 (2026-04-27) — major rewrite for external red-team posture. Added: pre-built wordlists (§16), 29-pattern secret catalog (§17), 50+ dork corpus (§18), GitHub code-search dorks (§19), endpoint interest score (§20), mobile ownership confidence (§21), identity-fabric concrete endpoints (§22), read-only secret validators (§23), Postman workspace search (§24), Stack Exchange sweep (§25), public SaaS dorks (§26), subdomain-source stack (§27), domain-level breach severity (§15.1), L2 explorer table (§30.2), USCC + ICP workflow (§14.2), cross-module sidecar coordination (§36), attack-path hint patterns (§39), severity decision matrix (§40), runnable secret-scan helper (§41). Strengthened: confidence levels (§2), output format (§3), do-not rules (§5). Original tool tables retained and lightly reorganized.

Related Skills & Chains

• web2-recon — When the arsenal needs to be executed against a live host set. Workflow primitive: this skill provides the probe paths and wordlists; web2-recon runs the actual subfinder → dnsx → httpx → katana pipeline that consumes them.
• osint-methodology — When this skill's concrete probes need a planning framework. Workflow primitive: osint-methodology is the planning skeleton (5-stage pipeline, asset graph, findings rubric); this skill is the operational arsenal that fills each stage with curl one-liners and regexes.
• hunt-subdomain — When this skill's subdomain enumeration finds stale CNAMEs. Workflow primitive: subdomains discovered via §27 / references/recon-stack.md get auto-routed to hunt-subdomain for takeover validation.
• hunt-cloud-misconfig — When this skill's cloud-bucket enum surfaces listable buckets / Firebase / actuator endpoints. Workflow primitive: §39 attack-path hints (listable bucket, /actuator/env, open Elasticsearch) hand off to hunt-cloud-misconfig for exploitation.
• m365-entra-attack / okta-attack — When identity-fabric fingerprinting finds Entra/Okta. Workflow primitive: references/identity-fabric.md fingerprints the IdP; matched platform skill (loaded by hunt-dispatch) takes over for active enumeration.