mcpbeat

Cc Hooks

boshu2/agentops-cc-hooks

Configure default Claude Code enforcement hooks and opt-in guard recipes. Triggers: "cc-hooks", "configure Claude Code hooks", "install hooks".

This is a copy. The original lives at boshu2/cc-hooks.

24k tokens
context cost
the whole folder, loaded on every use
15
files
ships runnable scripts
0
copies elsewhere
how many repositories repackaged it
416
stars on the repo
on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository
npx skills add https://github.com/boshu2/agentops --skill cc-hooks

The instruction itself

21 sections, as written by the author

Claude Code Hooks

Shell commands that fire at specific points in Claude Code's lifecycle.

Hooks enforce mechanically what prose cannot: a model can reason its way past

an instruction, but it cannot reason its way past an exit 2 — which is exactly

why every hook must be narrow, silent, and reversible.

Named failure mode — chatty happy path: a hook that emits stdout on exit 0

corrupts the tool call it was guarding; silence on success is part of the

contract, not a style preference.

Constraints

  • Enforcement hooks (the PreToolUse policy dispatcher) ship by DEFAULT: plugin installs auto-wire hooks/hooks.json; skill copies and checkouts wire with one command (scripts/install-hooks.sh). Operators can disable per host (/plugin disable, or remove the settings matchers).
  • Injection hooks (SessionStart/UserPromptSubmit context stuffing) stay dead — the #511 teardown proved delta=0 at 10.35M resident tokens. Never ship one; the hookless-cold-start gate still enforces this.
  • Keep the happy path silent and block only with the event's documented exit/JSON contract because stray stdout can corrupt a tool call.
  • Bound Stop hooks with stop_hook_active and scope matchers narrowly to prevent recursion and unrelated-command interception.

<!-- TOC: Quick Start | Events | Blocking | Writing Hooks | Anti-Patterns | References -->

Quick Start

Add to ~/.claude/settings.json (user) or .claude/settings.json (project):

{"hooks":{"PreToolUse":[{"matcher":"Bash","hooks":[{"type":"command","command":"my-validator.sh"}]}]}}

Hook Events

| Event | When | Blocks? | Common Use |

|-------|------|---------|------------|

| PreToolUse | Before tool runs | Yes | Block/modify commands |

| PostToolUse | After tool succeeds | Feedback | Auto-format, lint |

| PermissionRequest | Permission dialog | Yes | Auto-approve/deny |

| UserPromptSubmit | Prompt submitted | Yes | Add context, validate |

| Stop | Claude finishes | Yes | Force continue |

| SessionStart | Session begins | No | Load context, set env |

| Notification | Notifications | No | Desktop alerts |

Full schemas: HOOK-EVENTS.md

Matchers

"Bash"              → exact match
"Edit|Write"        → regex OR
"mcp__.*__write"    → MCP tools
"*" or ""           → all tools

Tools: Bash, Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep, Task, WebFetch, WebSearch

Exit Codes

| Code | Effect |

|------|--------|

| 0 | Success - JSON parsed from stdout |

| 2 | Block - stderr fed to Claude |

| Other | Non-blocking error |

Blocking a Tool

Simple (exit 2):

echo "Blocked: reason" >&2 && exit 2

JSON (exit 0):

{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"deny","permissionDecisionReason":"Blocked"}}

Decisions: "allow" (auto-approve), "deny" (block), "ask" (show dialog)

Modifying Input

{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"allow",
  "updatedInput":{"command":"modified-command"}}}

Real-World: DCG + RCH

{"hooks":{"PreToolUse":[{"matcher":"Bash","hooks":[
  {"type":"command","command":"dcg"},
  {"type":"command","command":"rch"}
]}]}}
  • DCG: Blocks git reset --hard, rm -rf, git push --force
  • RCH: Routes builds to remote workers

Details: DCG-RCH.md

Skill-First Coordination Guard (opt-in)

A copy-paste PreToolUse recipe that nudges agents to **load the coordination

skill before hand-rolling the am/atm/ntm/tmux send-keys CLI**. This

recipe auto-installs nothing; you opt in per host (unlike the policy

dispatcher, which ships by default).

Context-budget doctrine for hooks: hooks are the most powerful enforcement

(mechanical, can't be reasoned past) but they pollute context — use sparingly. A

hook must be SILENT on the happy path (exit 0, no stdout/stderr), fire ONLY on a

real violation (ideally once per session, sentinel-gated), prefer PreToolUse

violation-guards over UserPromptSubmit/SessionStart per-turn injectors, and

NEVER emit stray stdout on an exit-0 PreToolUse path (it is parsed as JSON and

breaks the tool call). Block via exit 2 + stderr.

The recipe ships both scripts verbatim, a precise head-only matcher (so a

br create --body "...am/atm/ntm..." never false-fires), the two-matcher

opt-in settings.json snippet, and a bats test proving every fire/silent case.

Recipe: SKILL-FIRST-COORDINATION-GUARD.md

Installed-Skill-Edit Guard (opt-in)

A PreToolUse Edit|Write guard that routes an edit of an installed skill copy

(*/.claude/skills/**, .codex, .gemini) back to the repo source of truth

skills/<name>/. This is a TRUE mistake-token — editing an installed/symlinked

copy has no legitimate form (overwritten on install, or symlinks through to the

factory checkout). Zero false-positive surface: it matches tool_input.file_path

only, so a doc that merely mentions claude/skills in its body never fires.

Reversible → it ROUTES (exit 2 + one-line redirect), not hard-blocks. Silent on

every other path; fires once per session. Ships INERT — opt-in installer:

scripts/install-installed-skill-edit-guard.sh   # user scope; --project for project

Recipe: INSTALLED-SKILL-EDIT-GUARD.md

Value-proof (why this guard survives the hookless teardown)

The keystone guard ships gate-blind per-fire telemetry: on each fire it

appends exactly one JSONL line — {ts, session, token_class, path_sha256} — to

${AGENTOPS_HOME:-~/.agents/ao}/guardrail-telemetry.jsonl (override with

AGENTOPS_GUARDRAIL_TELEMETRY). The path is SHA-256 hashed, never raw

(privacy); nothing is written on the happy path; the sensor is inert until the

guard is installed and fires. The pre-registered methodology — metric =

declining fire-ATTEMPT rate over time (a signal the redirect cannot fake, NOT the

circular hand-roll rate), minimum N, noise floor, and **null-at-small-N is an

acceptable outcome** — satisfies ADR-0002 l.58 ("test or eval evidence showing

positive value"), the criterion whose absence killed 2.x hooks (#511).

Methodology: GUARDRAIL-VALUE-PROOF.md

Policy Dispatch Engine (ships by default)

The admission-control layer (epic age-4qw1): one PreToolUse dispatcher —

hooks/policy-dispatch.sh — evaluating a

policies-as-data registry

(policies/policies.json, contract

schemas/hooks-manifest.v2.schema.json) instead of N hand-wired settings

entries. This is the membrane at tool-call altitude: same vocabulary, lower

altitude than the pawl/gate at push time.

Per policy: dcg-style id (domain.object:token), mode: deny | route | audit,

matchers (tool + command/file_path regex), a route_message that names THE

correct tool, a rationale, and a pre-registered value_proof (the ADR-0002

lease-on-life: no proof accruing → retire the policy).

Predicate discipline, schema-enforced (the #511 anti-lesson): only

predicate_class: pure — syntactic mistake-tokens over the command or file

path — may deny/route. Lookup/stateful predicates ship audit-only until

promoted with reviewed fires.

scripts/lint-policies.sh enforces this mechanically

(jq-only; runs in bats and CI).

Accepted false-positive surface: because a pure predicate matches its token

anywhere in the raw command string, a protected token quoted as *data* (a commit

message body, a dcg test "..." probe, a here-doc payload) can still fire even

though nothing harmful would run. This is the deliberate cost of the

pure-only-may-deny rule — the alternative (repo/context lookups) is exactly the

stateful predicate the discipline bars from deny. Every fire is reversible: a

one-shot AOP_WAIVE=<policy-id> or a policy-waivers line clears it.

Semantics: happy path = exit 0, zero output. deny = exit 2 + one stderr

route line (full message once per session, short line after — every attempt

still blocks). route = exit 0 + permissionDecision:"ask" JSON. audit =

allow + record. Every fire appends one hashed guardrail-telemetry line

(token_class = policy id, plus mode/decision). Waive once with

AOP_WAIVE=<policy-id>, or a policy-waivers file line

<policy-id> <expiry-epoch>. Missing registry or jq fails OPEN.

Day-1 enforce cohort (age-wnyt, all pure-regex, high-pain):

| Policy | Blocks | Routes to |

|---|---|---|

| core.git:add-beads-ledger | git add naming _beads/ (private ledger leak is one-way) | push the ledger repo itself — never git add _beads in the public tree |

| core.provenance:ledger-hand-append | redirect/tee/Edit/Write onto docs/provenance/ledger.jsonl (hash-chained, sealed) | ao provenance add |

| core.skills:copy-into-installed | cp/rsync/mv INTO ~/.claude|.codex|.gemini/skills (dest-position enforced) | ao skills link |

| core.skills:edit-installed-copy | Edit/Write of an installed skill copy (file_path only — prose can never fire it) | edit repo skills/<name>/ |

How it reaches users — every install path delivers hooks:

| Install path | Delivery |

|---|---|

| Claude Code plugin (claude plugin install agentops@agentops-marketplace) | Automatic — the plugin bundles hooks/hooks.json (${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} paths); hooks are active on install, no wiring step |

| npx skills@latest add boshu2/agentops / skills.sh copy | The skill package carries its own installer: ~/.claude/skills/cc-hooks/scripts/install-hooks.sh (one command; file copies cannot self-wire) |

| git clone / brew checkout | scripts/install-policy-dispatch.sh (delegates to the same skill-embedded installer) |

The installer lints the registry before wiring, backs up settings, and is

idempotent. Disable per host with /plugin disable agentops or by removing the

two PreToolUse matchers from settings.

Contract tests: tests/scripts/policy-dispatch.bats (block+message+telemetry

per policy, stray-stdout hazard, waivers, audit/route modes, fail-open).

Writing Your Own Hook

Minimal Python:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json, sys

data = json.load(sys.stdin)
cmd = data.get('tool_input', {}).get('command', '')

if 'dangerous' in cmd:
    print("Blocked: dangerous", file=sys.stderr)
    sys.exit(2)

sys.exit(0)  # Allow

Hook input (stdin):

{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"npm test"},"session_id":"...","cwd":"..."}

Environment Variables

| Variable | Scope | Purpose |

|----------|-------|---------|

| CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR | All | Project root |

| CLAUDE_ENV_FILE | SessionStart/Setup | Persist env vars |

Stop Hook (Force Continue)

{"decision":"block","reason":"Tests failing. Fix before stopping."}

Critical: Check stop_hook_active to prevent infinite loops.

Anti-Patterns

| Don't | Do |

|-------|-----|

| Old object format | Array format with matcher |

| Unquoted $VAR | "$VAR" |

| Exit 2 with JSON | Exit 2 uses stderr only |

| Skip stop_hook_active check | Always check in Stop hooks |

Debugging

claude --debug  # Hook execution details
/hooks          # View/edit in REPL

Output Specification

  • Path: user ~/.claude/settings.json or project .claude/settings.json, plus explicitly named hook scripts. The PreToolUse policy dispatcher ships by default (every install path wires it — see "Policy Dispatch Engine"); the additional guard recipes (skill-first coordination, standalone installed-skill-edit) stay inert until opted in.
  • Filename: preserve settings.json; give scripts descriptive executable filenames rather than embedding large shell programs in JSON.
  • Format: valid Claude hook JSON using event arrays, matchers, and command objects; hook stdout/stderr and exit codes follow the selected event schema.
  • Exit code: validate with jq -e '.hooks | type=="object"' <settings.json> and a representative silent/fire test for each matcher; any parse error, noisy happy path, or recursion risk blocks activation.
  • Downstream handoff: consumed by the operator only after the exact scope, reversal command, test evidence, and opt-in location are reported.

Quality Checklist

  • The matcher fires on the intended event/input and stays silent on representative near misses.
  • Blocking and allow paths use the documented exit code and output channel without leaking context.
  • The hook is reversible, narrowly scoped, recursion-safe, and clearly labeled as opt-in host policy.

References

  • HOOK-EVENTS.md - All events with full schemas
  • DCG-RCH.md - Production examples (dcg, rch)
  • INSTALLED-SKILL-EDIT-GUARD.md - Opt-in guard routing installed-skill edits to repo skills/ (keystone)
  • GUARDRAIL-VALUE-PROOF.md - Pre-registered value-proof methodology + per-fire telemetry contract (ADR-0002 l.58)
  • PATTERNS.md - Auto-format, logging, notifications
  • JSON-OUTPUT.md - Response schemas

How to use it

Copy the folder

Take boshu2/agentops-cc-hooks from the repository into ~/.claude/skills for personal use, or into .claude/skills inside a project.

Check the name does not clash

The agent identifies a skill by the name field in its header. Two skills with the same name cannot sit side by side — one of them will be ignored.

Install what it needs

The instructions reference npx. Without those the skill loads but fails at the first command.