mcpbeat

Night Market Completion Integrity Campaign

athola/night-market-completion-integrity-campaign

Bind loop 'done' to unfakeable gates. Use to harden egregore/herald loops or promote completion_integrity. Not for QA gates; use night-market-validation-and-qa.

7k tokens
context cost
the whole folder, loaded on every use
1
files
instructions only
0
copies elsewhere
how many repositories repackaged it
324
stars on the repo
on the repository, not the skill itself

Install

one command, takes just this skill from the repository
npx skills add https://github.com/athola/claude-night-market --skill night-market-completion-integrity-campaign

The instruction itself

21 sections, as written by the author

Night Market Completion-Integrity Campaign

This is an executable campaign, phased and decision-gated, against the

hardest live problem in this repository: making "done" in autonomous

loops mean something the agent cannot fake, and earning the promotion

of completion_integrity from default-off to default-on. Every command

below was run against the repo on 2026-07-02 (v1.9.15) unless marked

candidate. Run the phases in order. Each phase ends at a gate with

expected observations and branch instructions.

Definitions

| Term | Meaning |

|------|---------|

| Autonomous loop | A session that keeps working without a human turn: egregore's orchestrator (/egregore:summon), the externally installed ralph-wiggum loop, herald's auto-continue Stop hook |

| Stop hook | A Claude Code hook fired when the agent tries to end its turn. It prints {"decision": "approve"} (allow stop) or {"decision": "block", "reason": ...} (keep working) |

| Completion integrity | The property that a loop's "done" signal is bound to a verifier the agent does not control, instead of the agent's own say-so |

| False stop | The loop halts while verifiable work remains, or accepts a claimed completion that a check would have rejected |

| False continue | The loop keeps working (blocks the stop) on a turn that was genuinely finished |

| Verdict | The egregore quality-gate outcome: pass, pass-with-warnings, or fix-required (computed after a 3-attempt auto-fix loop) |

Problem statement

Three assets exist today. None of them, alone, binds "done" to an

unfakeable gate:

| Asset | What it does | Default | Key commits |

|-------|--------------|---------|-------------|

| plugins/egregore/scripts/config.py field PipelineConfig.completion_integrity | When true, a fix-required verdict counts as a step failure (the item cannot reach completed with blocking findings) and merge is held for human review regardless of auto_merge | False | 83281337 (gate), cd903cbf (raw-JSON opt-in test) |

| plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py (Stop hook) | Deterministic continue/stop judge over the last assistant message, with an opt-in LLM second shot for the single ambiguous outcome | Deterministic only | 268cff89 (timeout cap + gating) |

| plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md | The theory: a gate earns trust only if the spec is validated separately from the code and the check is proven able to fail | Prose guidance | 29081fda |

The load-bearing weakness, verified by reading commit 83281337: the

completion_integrity flag is real code with a tested load path, but

its enforcement lives in agent instructions

(plugins/egregore/agents/orchestrator.md, the egregore:quality-gate

skill, and skills/summon/modules/pipeline.md). No Python code path

blocks a pipeline transition. The manifest that records item status

(.egregore/manifest.json) is written by the same agent the gate is

supposed to bind. The campaign exists to close that gap with evidence.

Evidence bar

Success is measured, never judged by eye. The standing rules are

drawn from two 2026-07-01 research passes, whose evidence now lives

in .claude/rules/prefer-invariants-over-fallbacks.md (harness-loop

findings) and

plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md

(verifier findings), plus the load-bearing claims inlined below:

  • State the numbers a hypothesis predicts BEFORE running the

measurement. A threshold chosen after seeing the data is not a gate.

  • One mechanism must explain all observations, including the negative

ones.

  • Never let the generator be its own judge: LLM self-verification is

measurably unreliable and self-critique can degrade output, so

verdicts come from an independent verifier (prover-verifier

separation, arXiv 2402.08115; see

plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md).

  • A green check proves spec satisfaction, never correctness. Every

gate you add must itself be proven able to go red (verifier-integrity

Guard 2: mutation or revert test).

Campaign map

| Phase | Question it answers | Gate to pass |

|-------|--------------------|--------------|

| P0 | Do today's gate and judge suites pass as documented? | Exact pass counts reproduced |

| P1 | What does the gate log when enabled on real work? | Opt-in path exercised on a bounded item, logs captured |

| P2 | What are the false-stop and false-continue rates? | Pre-registered numbers met |

| P3 | Can the loop satisfy the gate without doing the work? | Refutation attempts run, holes documented or closed |

| P4 | Is the default flip earned? | Change control passed |

P0: baseline the gate and judge suites

Run every suite from inside its plugin directory. Root pytest sets

norecursedirs = plugins/*, so running from the repo root silently

collects nothing (or raises ImportPathMismatchError). Every cd

in this skill is relative to the repo root: start each command block

from there.

cd plugins/egregore
uv run pytest tests/ -q

Expected (2026-07-02): 477 passed in about 2 seconds, preceded by a

coverage table.

cd plugins/egregore
uv run pytest tests/test_config.py tests/test_quality_gate.py -q

Expected: 27 passed. tests/test_config.py alone is 13 passed and

includes the two completion-integrity guards:

test_completion_integrity_opt_in_roundtrip and

test_completion_integrity_loads_from_raw_json (the real user opt-in

path, added in cd903cbf. It also guards the field against silent

removal, because _filter_fields would drop the key).

cd plugins/herald
uv run pytest tests/ -q

Expected: 105 passed in under 2 seconds. This suite contains

test_llm_timeout_fits_within_hook_timeout, which asserts

LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (8) is strictly below the Stop-hook timeout

registered in plugins/herald/hooks/hooks.json (10).

cd plugins/imbue
uv run pytest tests/unit/skills/test_proof_of_work.py -q

Expected: 17 passed. Note: imbue's pytest addopts force coverage

artifacts on every run. There is no dedicated test for the

verifier-integrity module itself (verified 2026-07-02 by grepping

plugins/imbue/tests/ for verifier-integrity): the module is prose,

covered only by the skill-structure test above.

Smoke-test the herald judge directly. All three probes below were run

and their outputs captured verbatim on 2026-07-02:

echo '{"session_id":"probe","transcript_path":"/nonexistent"}' \
  | python3 plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py

Expected:

{"decision": "approve", "reason": "Double Shot Latte: No transcript available; allowing stop."}
D=$(mktemp -d)
printf '%s\n' '{"type":"assistant","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Now let me fix the failing tests."}]}}' \
  > "$D/t.jsonl"
echo "{\"session_id\":\"p1\",\"transcript_path\":\"$D/t.jsonl\"}" \
  | python3 plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py

Expected:

{"decision": "block", "reason": "Double Shot Latte: Assistant stated explicit intent to keep working."}

Gate P0 branches:

  • Pass counts lower than stated, or any failure: the repo has drifted

since 2026-07-02. Stop the campaign. Triage with

night-market-debugging-playbook, then update the counts in this

skill's Provenance section before proceeding.

  • ImportPathMismatchError or no tests ran: you ran pytest from the

wrong directory. Re-run from inside the plugin.

  • Hook probe emits nothing or a traceback: the hook contract is broken

(it must always exit 0 and print a decision). That is a P0 incident,

not a campaign step. File it.

P1: shadow observation, then opt-in on a bounded item

P1a: shadow read (no behavior change)

Verdicts are recorded in the manifest even with the flag off (the

egregore:quality-gate skill records every verdict as a decision entry

{"step": ..., "chose": ..., "why": ...}). So the flag-off world

already contains the shadow data: items that advanced to completed

despite a fix-required verdict. Count them in any repo where egregore

has run:

python3 - <<'EOF'
import json
from pathlib import Path

path = Path(".egregore/manifest.json")
if not path.exists():
    print(json.dumps({"error": "no manifest; egregore has not run here"}))
    raise SystemExit(0)
data = json.loads(path.read_text())
items = data.get("work_items") or data.get("items") or []
flagged = [
    {"id": i.get("id"), "status": i.get("status")}
    for i in items
    if any(d.get("chose") == "fix-required" for d in i.get("decisions", []))
]
print(json.dumps(
    {"total_items": len(items), "items_with_fix_required": flagged},
    indent=2,
))
EOF

Expected: a JSON summary. Any entry with "status": "completed" in

items_with_fix_required is a shadow-mode false completion: the exact

event the gate exists to prevent. Record the count as the P2 baseline.

Branch: no manifest exists in this repo's root (egregore is typically

summoned in target repos, and .egregore/ state lives where it ran).

If you have no manifest anywhere, skip to P1b and generate one.

P1b: enable the gate on a bounded run

The opt-in path is hand-editing the config JSON. This exact shape is

what test_completion_integrity_loads_from_raw_json covers:

unspecified pipeline fields keep their defaults.

mkdir -p .egregore
cat > .egregore/config.json <<'EOF'
{"pipeline": {"completion_integrity": true}}
EOF

Warning: if .egregore/config.json already exists, edit the existing

pipeline object instead of overwriting the file, or you will reset

overseer and alert settings to defaults.

Then run a small, disposable work item in bounded mode (bounded mode

stops when the time window expires, so the loop cannot run away while

you observe):

/egregore:summon "<one small, well-specified task>" --bounded --window 5h

Before summoning, read "Stopping and relaunch machinery" at the end

of this section: bounded mode expires on its own, but the watchdog

and SessionStart hook can still resurrect the loop.

What it logs and where:

  • .egregore/manifest.json: per-item status (active, paused,

pending count as unfinished for the Stop hook, while completed

and failed are terminal), attempts, max_attempts (default 3),

and the decisions array holding each quality verdict.

  • .egregore/relaunch-prompt.md: the re-injection prompt the egregore

Stop hook (plugins/egregore/hooks/stop_hook.py) uses when it blocks

an exit with active work remaining.

  • Overseer alerts per .egregore/config.json (pipeline_failure

fires when an item exhausts attempts).

Expected observations with the flag on, per the documented contract in

plugins/egregore/skills/quality-gate/SKILL.md and

agents/orchestrator.md:

  • A fix-required verdict routes to failure handling: the item

retries in place, and after max_attempts it is marked failed

with the overseer alerted. It is never silently completed.

  • Merge is held for human review regardless of auto_merge: the PR

is prepared but left open.

  • The loop itself does not halt: it continues with the next active

item.

Gate P1 branches:

  • An item reaches completed with an unresolved fix-required

decision while the flag is true: the orchestrator ignored its

instructions. This confirms the prompt-level enforcement gap in the

problem statement. Record the manifest as evidence and carry it into

P3. The finding argues for solution (a) or (b) below, which move

enforcement out of the prompt.

  • The item loops in retry forever: max_attempts is not being

incremented. That is an orchestrator bug, not a gate result. File it

with the manifest attached.

Stopping and relaunch machinery

Know the stop path before you summon. The loop runs indefinitely by

default and never stops on its own

(plugins/egregore/commands/dismiss.md).

  • /egregore:dismiss is the only sanctioned stop. It pauses all

active items in the manifest, cancels the orchestrator's cron jobs,

and removes the pidfile (.egregore/pid).

  • The pidfile is what the watchdog daemon polls. If

/egregore:install-watchdog has run on the machine,

plugins/egregore/scripts/watchdog.sh fires every 5 minutes via

launchd or systemd and relaunches a session whenever the manifest

has unfinished work, the budget allows it, and no pidfile marks a

live session. Killing a session without dismissing therefore gets

you silently relaunched sessions.

  • A SessionStart hook (matcher startup|resume in

plugins/egregore/hooks/hooks.json) auto-resumes orchestration in

new and resumed sessions while egregore state is active. Closing

the terminal is not a stop either.

  • .egregore/budget.json bounds spend. The watchdog checks it before

relaunching, so an exhausted budget halts relaunches even without a

dismiss.

P2: measure false-stop and false-continue rates

Fix the acceptance numbers before running anything. The numbers below

are candidates recorded at authoring time. Whoever executes P2 must

confirm or amend them, in writing, before the first measurement run.

| Metric | Definition | Candidate gate |

|--------|-----------|----------------|

| Egregore false completions | Items completed with an unresolved fix-required verdict, flag on | 0 over N >= 20 work items |

| Egregore false failures | Items failed whose findings a human reviewer judges non-blocking | <= 2 of 20 (candidate) |

| Herald false continue | Judge blocks a stop on a turn a human labels finished | <= 5% over N >= 30 labeled transcripts (candidate) |

| Herald false stop | Judge approves a stop on a turn with explicit stated intent to continue | <= 10% over the same set (candidate) |

The asymmetry is deliberate: herald's false continue burns tokens and

nags a finished session, while its false stop merely hands control to

the human. The judge is biased to stop by design, so tolerate more

false stops than false continues.

Herald measurement harness (candidate, offline and read-only): collect

real session transcripts, hand-label the final assistant message of

each as finished / awaiting-user / continuing, then score the

deterministic judge against the labels:

for t in "$HOME"/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl; do
  verdict=$(printf '{"session_id":"m","transcript_path":"%s"}' "$t" \
    | python3 plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py)
  echo "$t $verdict"
done

Notes for the harness: the event omits stop_hook_active, so the

throttle counter is not consulted, and DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_LLM unset

keeps the run deterministic and network-free. Compute the confusion

matrix against your labels by hand or with a 20-line script. Commit the

labeled set alongside the numbers so the measurement is reproducible.

Egregore measurement: repeat P1b across N >= 20 items (candidate N) and

tally the manifest with the P1a script. Do not curate which items go

in. Take a contiguous slice of real backlog.

Gate P2 branches:

  • Numbers met: proceed to P3.
  • Herald false-continue rate blows the gate: inspect which

_CONTINUE_PATTERNS regex fired on finished turns and tighten it.

That is deterministic gate expansion, solution (a); re-run the same

labeled set after the change.

  • Egregore false completions are nonzero: enforcement is not binding.

Do not tune thresholds to pass. Go to P3 and then to solution (a) or

(b).

P3: adversarial self-test (design the refutation)

The question: can the loop satisfy the gate without doing the work? Run

each attack, record the result, and either close the hole or document

it as accepted residual risk with an owner.

Attack A: talk your way past the herald judge

Verified on 2026-07-02: a transcript whose final assistant message is

"Everything is done and verified, tests passing green." gets

{"decision": "approve", "reason": "Double Shot Latte: Assistant signaled the work is complete."}

with zero checks run. The judge is a conversation-state classifier over

the last 800 characters of assistant text (TAIL_CHARS), by design. It

answers "does the agent intend to continue?", never "is the work

actually done?". Conclusion, standing: herald's verdict must never be

used as completion proof. Any design that treats a Stop-hook approve as

evidence of completion fails this attack by construction.

Attack B: fake the egregore manifest

With completion_integrity true, hand-edit one work item in

.egregore/manifest.json from active to completed while its

decisions still contain a fix-required. Then feed the egregore Stop

hook a stop event:

echo '{}' | python3 plugins/egregore/hooks/stop_hook.py

Expected (run from a directory whose walk-up finds that manifest): the

hook checks only status in ("active", "paused", "pending") via

has_active_work and prints {"decision": "approve"}. Nothing

cross-checks decisions against status. This demonstrates the residual

hole: the manifest is agent-writable state, so an orchestrator that

lies in the manifest defeats the gate. Candidate hardening (unbuilt):

teach the Stop hook to refuse completed status on items whose most

recent quality decision is fix-required, which moves one enforcement

point out of the prompt and into code the agent does not author

mid-loop. Treat that as a P4 prerequisite discussion item, not a given.

Attack C: mutation-prove every gate you add

Any new deterministic check earns trust only by going red on a real

break (verifier-integrity Guard 2). For each check added during this

campaign, record evidence in the module's format:

[V1] Check: <the test or gate>
     Encodes requirement: <observable behavior, stated from intent>
     Fake-resistance: <mutation applied> -> <check went RED: yes/no>
     Independence: <executable / who verified>
     Passing run: <command + output reference>

A single surviving mutation is a hole in the gate, not a rounding

error.

Solution menu, ranked

Ranked by fake-resistance. Each carries a theory obligation the

implementation must discharge.

  • Deterministic gate expansion (a). Grow the executable side of the

verdict: convention checks, tests, lints, result artifacts that run

outside the agent's narrative. Obligation: every check

mutation-proven (Guard 2) and, where a property exists, asserted as

a property rather than pinned examples (Guard 4). The principle

from the harness research: the agent "can still cut a corner, it

just can't cut this one past a check it doesn't control."

  • Separated verifier agent (b). A second session, with no access to

the producer's reasoning, evaluates the diff against the acceptance

criteria and returns localized findings. Obligation:

prover-verifier separation (the generator never judges itself:

LLM self-verification is measurably unreliable), localized feedback

piped back for targeted repair, and a hard attempt cap after which

the failure is reported instead of forced green. Status: candidate,

no implementation in this repo yet.

  • LLM judge second shot (d). Acceptable only as a tiebreaker for a

single ambiguous outcome, exactly as herald gates it: the LLM is

consulted only when the deterministic verdict is the default-stop

reason, its subprocess timeout stays strictly below the registered

hook budget with a guard test, and a recursion-guard env var stops

the judge's own Stop hook from spawning judges. Obligation: never

let it override a confident deterministic verdict.

  • Human checkpoint (c). Hold the merge open for human review, which

is what completion_integrity already does. Open question, on

record in .claude/rules/prefer-invariants-over-fallbacks.md:

whether the discipline of keeping a human judge survives competitive

and security pressure is the contested point between Ronacher and

his critics. Keep the human checkpoint as the backstop, and never

count it as the automated gate.

Known wrong paths (fenced off)

| Wrong path | Evidence | What happened |

|------------|----------|---------------|

| Subprocess timeout at or above the registered hook budget | 268cff89, and the guard test test_llm_timeout_fits_within_hook_timeout | herald's LLM call outlived the registered hook budget, so the harness killed the hook before it printed any decision at all (full record: night-market-failure-archaeology SB7). Cap child timeouts strictly below the registered budget and pin the relation with a test |

| Letting the generator judge its own output | arXiv 2402.08115, folded into imbue:proof-of-work/verifier-integrity | Self-verification is frequently no better than generation and self-critique can degrade output. Verdicts must come from an independent verifier |

| Assuming hook payloads arrive in env vars | CHANGELOG 1.9.14 ("Hooks read the tool payload from stdin, not unset env vars") | Hooks reading CLAUDE_TOOL_* were silent no-ops for months (full record: night-market-failure-archaeology SB9). Payload is JSON on stdin. Use shared/hook_io.read_hook_payload |

| Shipping an optional branch no test exercises | 268cff89 added 81 test lines for the LLM path | The deterministic suite was green while the opt-in LLM branch was broken by construction. Every opt-in branch needs at least one test that walks it |

| Treating "done" text as a completion gate | Attack A above, plus the harness research: a completion promise must pair with an iteration cap and manual abort | String-matched completion is trivially fakeable and herald proves it live |

| Prompt-only enforcement of a code-level guarantee | P1/P3 findings in this campaign | The flag flips real code, but nothing in code blocks the transition, so a non-compliant orchestrator defeats it. Move at least one enforcement point into a hook or script |

P4: promotion through change control

Flipping completion_integrity to default-on changes the documented

posture of every egregore deployment. It routes through

night-market-change-control. Do not shortcut it.

Preconditions, all required:

  • [ ] P2 numbers met at the pre-registered thresholds, raw data

committed.

  • [ ] P3 attacks run, with Attack B either closed by a code-side check

or formally accepted in the ADR with an owner.

  • [ ] The promotion decision drafted as a numbered ADR in docs/adr/

(next free number: ADR-0017 is the highest as of 2026-07-02),

because this reverses a deliberate recorded default.

Implementation order (Iron Law: failing test first):

  • Branch per convention: <topic>-<version>, from master.
  • Turn the default's tests red first: in

plugins/egregore/tests/test_config.py, change

test_pipeline_defaults to expect completion_integrity is True

and run it. Expected: 1 failure, proving the test binds the default.

  • Flip the default in plugins/egregore/scripts/config.py

(PipelineConfig.completion_integrity: bool = True) and re-run:

   cd plugins/egregore
   uv run pytest tests/test_config.py tests/test_quality_gate.py -q
  • Update every document that states the default is off. Verified

list as of 2026-07-02 (re-derive with the rg command in Provenance):

plugins/egregore/scripts/config.py (comment),

plugins/egregore/tests/test_config.py (comment),

plugins/egregore/agents/orchestrator.md,

plugins/egregore/skills/quality-gate/SKILL.md,

plugins/egregore/skills/summon/modules/pipeline.md,

plugins/egregore/README.md.

  • Add a CHANGELOG entry under [Unreleased] in Keep a Changelog

format. Never rewrite historical entries.

  • Check the diff against the 200-line AI-commit cap (CONSTITUTION

rule 2). The code flip is tiny, but the doc sweep plus ADR may

exceed it: if so, the ADR itself is the required planning doc;

reference it in the commit body.

  • Run the standard gates before committing (make lint,

make typecheck, plugin tests) and follow the PR flow in

night-market-operations.

Rollback: the flag remains user-overridable either way

({"pipeline": {"completion_integrity": false}} in

.egregore/config.json), so promotion is reversible per-deployment

without a code change. State this in the ADR.

When NOT to use

  • Routine test, lint, or release execution: use

night-market-operations.

  • General evidence standards and coverage thresholds outside the loop

problem: use night-market-validation-and-qa.

  • Hook mechanics, timeouts, and registration syntax: use

claude-code-plugin-reference.

  • The history of why these guards exist (SB7, SB9, and friends): use

night-market-failure-archaeology.

  • Classifying and gating the promotion change itself: this skill

routes there, but the authority is night-market-change-control.

  • Open research directions beyond this campaign (for example

hook-side manifest cross-checks as a general pattern): use

night-market-research-frontier.

Exit Criteria

  • [ ] P0 pass counts reproduced from inside each plugin directory

(egregore full suite, herald suite, imbue proof-of-work test) and

all three herald smoke probes emit the documented JSON verdicts.

  • [ ] P1b executed at least once: a bounded egregore run with

pipeline.completion_integrity true, with the resulting

.egregore/manifest.json captured as evidence.

  • [ ] P2 thresholds written down and dated BEFORE the measurement

runs, and the labeled data plus confusion matrix committed

alongside the computed rates.

  • [ ] P3 Attacks A and B executed with recorded outcomes, and every

gate added during the campaign has a [V1]-format

fake-resistance record showing a mutation went red.

  • [ ] Promotion either completed through P4 (ADR merged, default

flipped, docs and CHANGELOG updated, tests green) or explicitly

parked with the blocking metric named in the ADR draft.

  • [ ] No step of the campaign treated a Stop-hook approve or an

agent's completion message as evidence of completed work.

Provenance and maintenance

Compiled 2026-07-02 against repo v1.9.15, branch state

discussions-fix-1.9.14. "Stopping and relaunch machinery" subsection

added to P1b on 2026-07-03. Volatile facts and how to re-verify them:

  • Test pass counts (477 egregore, 27 config+quality, 13 config alone,

105 herald, 17 imbue proof-of-work) date from 2026-07-02. Re-run the

P0 commands and update this file when they drift.

  • Gate implementation and defaults:

rg -n "completion_integrity" plugins/egregore/ should list

config.py, test_config.py, orchestrator.md, quality-gate SKILL.md,

pipeline.md, and README.md. A new hit means new enforcement surface

to fold into P4 step 4.

  • Herald timeout relation: `rg -n "LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS" \

plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py` (expect 8) and the

"timeout" value in plugins/herald/hooks/hooks.json (expect 10).

  • Herald judge env switches: DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_LLM=1 enables the

second shot, DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_MODEL picks the model (default

haiku), DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_MAX_CONTINUATIONS overrides the cap of

10 per 300-second window. Re-verify with

rg -n "os.environ" plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py.

  • Stop and relaunch machinery: re-verify with

head -30 plugins/egregore/commands/dismiss.md,

head -25 plugins/egregore/scripts/watchdog.sh (manifest, budget,

and pidfile paths), and

rg -n "startup|resume" plugins/egregore/hooks/hooks.json

(SessionStart matcher). Verified 2026-07-03.

  • Key commits: git show --stat 83281337 cd903cbf 268cff89 29081fda.
  • Research grounding: .claude/rules/prefer-invariants-over-fallbacks.md

("Evidence base" table) and

plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md

("Reusable verifier techniques"). Both are tracked, so the citations

resolve on a fresh clone.

  • Highest ADR number: ls docs/adr/ | sort | tail -1 (0017 as of

compilation).

  • Candidate items in this file (P2 thresholds and N values, the P2

herald harness loop, the Attack B hook-side hardening, solution (b)

verifier agent) are unproven by definition. Remove the label only

with committed evidence.

How to use it

Copy the folder

Take athola/night-market-completion-integrity-campaign from the repository into ~/.claude/skills for personal use, or into .claude/skills inside a project.

Check the name does not clash

The agent identifies a skill by the name field in its header. Two skills with the same name cannot sit side by side — one of them will be ignored.